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I. Introduction
A look at the American and German antitrust scenario
reveals significant differences:
In America the approach towards antitrust, especially
the appropriate treatment of vertical restraints such as
resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, and tying
arrangements, is hotly contested. A "battle for the soul
of antitrust":!.has started. The outcome of this "battle"
will decide which goals will govern American antitrust law2
and which analysis will be applied in determining the
reasonableness of vertical restraints.3 Both issues are of
crucial importance for the future role of antitrust law,
especially with regard to application to vertical
restraints.
The "contestants" in this struggle for the "right"
approach are the Chicago Schoo14 on the one side and their
opponents of the New CoalitionS on the other. The Chicago
School reduces the possible number of antitrust goals to the
single goal of maximizing consumer welfare measured by means
of efficiency.6 In contrast, the New Coalition asserts that
antitrust policy pursues a multi-valued goal.?
1
2Similar to the discrepancy in defining the goals of an-
titrust, the proper analysis for evaluating the competitive
impact of vertical restraints is also contested. The Chicago
School applies neoclassical economic theory to scrutinize
the antitrust implications of vertical restraints.B
According to this theory vertical restraints are considered
to be efficiency creating. Consequently, the Chicago School
alleges that in this area antitrust law should not inter-
fere.9 T~e New Coalition rejects the application of neoclas-
sical economic theory as insufficient to adaequately
evaluate vertical restraints and promotes its multi-value
orientated approach.10
This debate is not merely academic, but has gained con-
siderable influence on American antitrust enforcement.11 The
Chicago School's approach is reflected in the administra-
tion's antitrust policy under President Reagan12 and has
gained considerable influence on the reasoning of the
courts.13
The result of this battle is confusion, and its victim
is American antitrust law. More precisely, the predic-
tability and reliability required by the "rule of law"14 is
no longer existing in the area of vertical restraints.15
The German Law against Restrictions of Competition
(GWB),16 on the other hand, favors the rule of law ("Rechts-
sicherheit") by promoting reliability and predictability.17
Interestingly, the GWB does not promote debate like the
American antitrust law. Like American antitrust law the GWB
3demands policy decisions and the application of economic
theory; however, the Chicago School's approach has not
gained perceivable influence on the German antitrust scene.
Rather, according to the public policy of the GWB, the ap-
plication of neoclassical economic theory is deemed to be
inappropriate to cope with market imperfections.~B Moreover,
the GWB clearly states that it pursues a multi-valued goal
of antitrust policy.~9
The purpose of this study is to compare the GWB's
approach towards vertical restraints with the contending
theories of the Chicago School and the New Coalition. This
comparison might be of special interest because the GWB bor-
rowed much of its substance from the American antitrust law,
and both the GWB and American antitrust law are based on the
assumption that competition should control the market. 20
Because of these similarities the discovery of dis-
crepancies between the GWB's approach and the American
theories could reveal points for further inquiry and may un-
veil weaknesses of either theory.
A. Scope of of the Study
The approach towards vertical restraints depends heavi-
ly on the outcome of the "battle for the soul of anti-
titrust".2~ Therefore, to make the implications of the dis-
pute more comprehensible, this study necessarily has to
4refer to the basics of antitrust policy such as legislative
history and political underpinnings.
The present confusion in American antitrust law was
enabled by broad and vague statutes which allowed both
scholars and courts to give the antitrust law such a wide
interpretation.22 Moreover, the legal system, its method,
its procedure, and its enforcement contribute to this con-
fusion. Accordingly, the legal system should take the
responsibility for leading the way out of this dilemma.
Hence the differences between American antitrust en-
forcement and the German approach towards antitrust law
mainly rest in policy and method of the respective legal
system this study attempts to provide a short but instruc-
tive description of policy and methods of the American and
German antitrust laws in chapter two.
'rhe second chapter addresses also the underlying values
of American and German antitrust laws and compares the con-
cepts choosen to protect these values.
Based on these foundations, chapter three evaluates
resale price maintenance. Economic and policy arguments sur-
rounding resale price maintenance are scrutinized, and the
approach of American antitrust law is compared with the
solution of the GWB.
In chapter four, the Supreme Court's judgment in Busi-
ness Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.23 is
analyzed according to the GWB perspective.
5The fifth chapter deals with other, nonprice vertical
restraints. The approach of the GWB and its policy con-
siderations with regard to these restraints is described and
compared with the approach of the American antitrust law.
The last two chapters summarize, conclude, and suggest
improvements for the American antitrust law.
B. Objective and Method of the Study
The study attempts to give the reader a description of
both the American and German antitrust law in the area of
vertical restraints. It is the objective of this study to
explain the approach towards vertical restraints and the
function of economic theory of both the American and German
antitrust law. According to this objective this study does
not provide in-depth discussion of a multitude of
restraints. Rather, this study focuses on underlying ideas
and policies of antitrust law in the area of vertical
restraints. The approach of the German and American an-
titrust law will be illustrated by addressing the most im-
portant vertical restraints. Additionally, the analysis of
several cases intends to make the reader more familiar with
the reasoning of the German courts.
II. American and GermanAntitrust Law -- an OVerview with
Special Regard to Vertical Restraints
An analysis of the American and German approach towards
vertical restraints would be incomplete without a look at
the historical development. Neither the approach of American
antitrust law which can look back on one hundred years of
experience and even older common law precedents nor the
approach of the "young" German antitrust law which celebra-
tes its 30th anniversary24 can be understood without refe-
rence to legislative history and development.25
A. Development of the American Antitrust Law with Special
Regard to Vertical Restraints
The Sherman Act of 189026 and the Clayton Act of 191427
were the first federal antitrust laws enacted in the United
States, codifying "the rules of the common law".2B The com-
mon law rules against restraints of trade29 were deemed in-
sufficient to deal with the demands of an increasingly in-
dustrialized nation.30 The Sherman and the Clayton Act were
intended to challenge the power of the trusts31 that were
formed to impair competition, exploit workers, defraud in-
vestors, and threaten liberty.32
6
7The basic norm against restraints of trade is Section 1
Sherman Act.33 Section 1 Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
violation of the antitrust law.
scrutiny. 40
"restraints on alienation".42 In more recent decisions the
A literal reading" 34.....
decisions4~ the courts referred to common law rules, such as
a per se antitrust violation were inconsistent. In early
However, the courts in determining of what conduct was
inflexibility of these rules was recognized. Therefore, in
violation of the antitrust law -- thus condemned without
to distinguish between conduct constituting a "per se"
Another important step was the development of standards
1. Development of Standards
Accordingly, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel CO.3B
duct which is subject to more lenient "rule of reason"
further inquiry into possible justifications39 -- and con-
held that only unreasonable restraints constitute a
means of interpreting antitrust law.37
and applied in subsequent decisions a more sophisticated
literal application would outlaw benign business behavior,
ly.36 However, the judiciary realized soon that this
the courts indeed interpreted Sec. 1 Sherman Act literal-
restraint violates Sec. 1 Sherman Act.35 In early decisions
of the statutory language would constitute that every
conspiracy, in restraint of trade
8
Sylvania43 a more practicable approach towards vertical
restraints was established, considering business needs and
economic theory. At present, a trend towards a very reluc-
tant application of per se rules in the area of vertical
restraints is perceivable. Accordingly, the burden of proof
to establish a per se violation of the antitrust is prohibi-
tively high.44
2. The Vertical/Horizontal Distinction
The American antitrust law generally distinguishes
between horizonta145 and vertical restraints.46 Horizontal
restraints on competition are held illegal per se.47
Since the 1977 landmark case Sylvania4B vertical
restraints are -- except of resale price maintenance49 and
certain tying arrangements50 subject to rule of reason
scrutiny. The court reasoned in Sylvania that the rule of
reason is the proper standard by which to evaluate vertical
restraints. Only a rule of reason analysis enables the
courts to weigh procompetitive effects on interbrand com-
petition against anticompetitive effects on intrabrand com-
petition. The Sylvania court held that a decrease in in-
trabrand competition may be outweighed by an increase in
interbrand competition.51 In Sylvania, economic analysis of
the effects of the particular restraint replaced the mere
reliance on the traditional common law rule of restraints on
alienation the court had established in United States v.
Arnold Schwinn & CO.52
93. Rule of Reason Analysis and Economic Theory
The continuing trend of employing economic theory is
reflected in decisions upholding vertical restraints because
of their economic benefits.53 Reliance on economic theory
was fostered by the economic theory of the Chicago School
and is increasingly becoming the pole star of judicial
reasoning.54 This development might change the application
of the antitrust law on vertical restraints drastically.
Significantly, an increasing number of decisions of lower
courts55 feels uncomfortable with the per se rule and state-
ments of the Department of Justice56 indicate that the per
se rule for resale price maintenance should be abolished.
Even of greater importance is the trend to analyse vertical
restraints by application of the neoclassical economic
theory of the Chicago School.57 According to this rationale,
the value of intrabrand competition would be ignored, and,
briefly, vertical restraints would be no longer of antitrust
concern. This theory faces opposition from a coalition of
scholars who assert that the Chicago School's approach is
biased, single sided and improper. If this opposing view
should prevail vertical restraints would not be erased from
the landmap of antitrust law.
At present, this area of antitrust law is hotly debated
and it is not clear which approach will prevail.
In conclusion, American antitrust law in the area of
vertical restraints is unclear. The outcome of any case
10
case depends heavily upon which of the theories the majority
of the deciding judges prefers.58
B. Other Laws Affecting Vertical Restraints
Unlike the German antitrust law which is contained in
one code59 the American antitrust law is contained in
several statutes. The relevant provisions which might apply
in the context of vertical restraints are:
1. Federal Trade Commission Act
Another significant development in the history of
American antitrust enforcement was the enactment of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.GO Under Sec. 5 of the FTC Act,
the Federal Trade Commission can prosecute violations of the
Sherman Act as "unfair methods of competition." Although the
FTC has no specific jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman Act,
Sec. 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC a broader authority to
challenge antitrust violations as unfair competition unbound
by the limitations of the Sherman Act.G~ This study focuses
on the Sherman and Clayton Act. What constitutes a violation
of Sec. 5 FTC Act will not be discussed. However, like under
the Clayton and Sherman Acts the central question under the
FTC Act is what conduct is justified under the antitrust
law.
11
2. Sec. 2 Sherman Act
Strategic market conduct and even unilateral conduct
may be challenged under Sec. 2 Sherman Act if this conduct
constitutes monopolization or an attempt to monopolize. 52
3. Sec. 2 Clayton as Amended by the Robinson-Patman Act
Under the Robinson-Patman Act price discrimination is
prohibited. The goals of the Robinson-Patman Act are
twofold: "One is the suppression of discrimination as an
anticompetitive practice; the other, the protection of small
individual firms from price disadvantages in their transac-
tions in the market."53 Scholars point out that "these two
purposes, in practice, have no necessary correlation."54
Unlike the German statute against price discrimination the
Robinson-Patman Act does not distinguish between the size of
the firm employing price discrimination.55
4. Other Laws
The fargoing freedom the American antitrust law leaves
to the sellers or franchisors was deemed unsufficient to
adequately protect the partner in certain relationships.
Thus, so-called "dealer termination" or "franchise" laws
were enacted in several states.55 Furthermore, some state
laws directly deal with subject matter in the area of verti-
cal restraints.57 These laws may overlap with antitrust law
and may provide better protection than antitrust law.58
However, a discussion of these laws is beyond the scope of
12
this study. But it is interesting to note that state laws
attempt to cure shortcomings of the Federal antitrust
statutes.
C. Development of the German Antitrust Law
The German antitrust law has no common law tradition to
look back on. In 1897, about the time the first decisions
under the Sherman Act rigidly prohibited restrictive agree-
ments,69 the Reichsgericht70 held that a cartel did not
constitute a violation of existing law. In the wake of this
decision Germany became the "classic land of the cartels."
This era of cartels reached its summit during World War II.
At that time German industry was heavily cartelizised. After
WW II German industry was decartelizised by the Allies under
decartelization statutes.
In 1957 the Law against Restraints of Competition
(Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen (GWB))71 was passed.
Although the GWB adopted much from American antitrust law,
the underlying economic policy was mainly influenced by the
scholars of the Freiburg School who promoted an ordoliberal
approach. 72
The GWB embraces all kinds of restraints and was amen-
ded four times, the last time in 1980. The amendments were
partly a reaction of the courts' interpretation of the 1957
draft which required curative legislative action.73 Thus,
the BWG follows a civil law concept. Both the statute and
13
its amendments primarily reflect the development of the Ger-
man antitrust law. However, it is also necessary to look at
the reasoning of the courts thus the dynamic and breadth of
the statutory scope requires iudicial interpretation. The
GWB contains "general clauses", "vague terms", and some "in-
definite legal concepts" which are subject to interpretation
by the courts.,4 Nevertheless, the interpretation of these
clauses, terms, and concepts by the decisionmaker is norma-
tively directed.'s The discretion of the courts is limited
by established rules of interpretation'6 and has to comply
with and foster the basic policy of the GWB. Therefore there
is no place for a rule of reason in the GWB, since the rule
of reason would leave too much room for discretionary or
political decisions to the courts."
The American debate surrounding the "soul of an-
titrust",B and the Chicago School's approach are closely
watched by German scholars and antitrust enforcers.,9
However, for at least two reasons the Chicago School's
economic theory has had no perceivable impact on German an-
titrust law. First, the courts cannot alter the law that
dramatically without legislative action. Second, legislative
action was not taken and is not to expected. Thus, the
Chicago School's approach is considered contrary to German.
antitrust policy.BO
Interestingly, both the policy of the GWB and the en-
forcement attitude of the Federal Cartel Authority resembles
the American antitrust enforcement in the 1960's and
14
1970's.B1 The lenient enforcement attitude of the 1980's,
however, was not adopted by the GWB.B2
1. Concept of the GWB
The standards of antitrust enforcement are laid down in
the statutes of the GWB. The GWB consists of over 100 ar-
ticles, about the first third of which are substantive rules
containing detailed provisions regarding to competitive con-
duct.B3
a) Enforcement Principles
The GWB provides two enforcement principles: prohibi-
tion and abuse control. Sometimes typically prohibited con-
duct may be allowed under a specific exemption norm.B4 It is
to note that unilateral conduct such as refusal to sell and
discrimination may be prohibited as abusive and/or dis-
criminatory.
b) Distinction Relating to Conduct
The GWB distinguishes between cartel agreements,B5
other agreements,BG abuse control,B? and merger control.BB
Cartel agreements are "agreements which pursue a 'common
purpose,,,.B9 Cartel agreements are subject to the prohibi-
tion principle and void. "Other agreements" are agreements
which impose a restriction on one of the parties in a con-
tractual relationship. These "other agreements" are sub-
divided in (l)resale price maintenance,9o (2)"normal" other
15
agreements91 (imposing nonprice restrictions), and (3)licen-
sing agreements.92
While resale price maintenance is prohibited,93 other
agreements, such as exclusive dealing arrangements and tying
are presumably legal and subject to abuse control.94 The
latter agreements, however, will be considered abusive if
they constitute an attempt to compel a customer to adhere to
a pricing scheme.95
c) Horizontal/Vertical Distinction
The GWB does not explicitly distinguish between
horizontal and vertical restraints.96 Nevertheless, in al-
most all cases the vertical/horizontal distinction of the
GWB will be the same as under American antitrust law:97
A "common purpose" arrangement (which is a per se illegal
cartel -- unless exempted) will generally exist in agree-
ments or conspiracies among enterprises on the same level of
distribution. This resembles the American per se rule
against horizontal restraints.9B
An arrangement involving an imposed restraint (which is a
presumed legal "other agreement" -- except for resale price
maintenance) will generally exist in agreements among enter-
prises on different levels of distribution. This catego-
rization resembles the American concept of vertical
restraints. 99
16
2. Focus of Enforcement in the Area Vertical Restraints
In Germany, the enforcement activity in the area of
vertical restraints concentrates on resale price maintenance
and abusive and discriminatory conduct of "powerful"
firms.loo Because -- according to the clear language of § 15
GWB -- an explicit agreement on resale price maintenance in
direct violation of the GWB will be hardly employed by a
businessmen. Therefore, the Federal Cartel Authority focuses
especially on attempts to circumvent § 15 GWB, for example
by establishing untrue agency relationshipslOl or by using
economic means to coerce (or lure) customers to adhere to a
certain pricing scheme.102
With regard to the abuse control of other agreements
under § 18 GWB, the Federal Cartel Authorities' enforcement
effort is slight. Reason for this lack of effort include the
complicated statutory setting of § 18 GWB and the fact that
the Federal Cartel Authority obviously regards the threat to
competition by powerful firms more dangerous. Accordingly,
the Federal Cartel Authority concentrates on the abuse con-
trol provisions of §§ 22 and 26 GWB rather than on § 18 GWB
when challenging vertical nonprice restraints.103
Nonetheless, this reluctance to enforce § 18 GWB is
outweighed by increased efforts to control abusive or dis-
criminatory conduct of market dominating firms or firms
which are able to create a dependency relationship.104
17
D. The Impact of the Legal Method on Antitrust Enforcement
The significant criticism of American antitrust law as
opposed to the general acceptance of German antitrust law~o5
is due to the legal method by which the law is applied as
well as material law itself. As Maxeiner~o6 points out the
problems of American antitrust law are largely problems of
legal method.~o7 For example, the dramatic shift in American
antitrust policy was possible without legislative action.
Thus, the vague and broad language of American antitrust law
leaves a farreaching discretion to the courts.
The vagueness and ambiguity of American antitrust law
does not satisfy the necessity to have predictable rules on
which businessmen can base their decisions. Interestingly,
the concern that this ambiguity might deter beneficial and
procompetitive conduct instead of promoting free market com-
petition and the fact that ambiguity itself is deemed un-
satisfactory are reasons of the success of the simplistic
approach of the Chicago School. This approach gives a
feeling of security, strengthening the notion that courts
will make "right" decisions if they rely on a "rational,
scientific" theory rather than struggle with difficult
economic concepts and public policy notions.~oa
For example, in Business Electronics,~o9 the Supreme
Court refused to consider the facts of the case and instead
concluded on the basis of economic theory. In Business
Electronics Hartwell, one of two Sharp dealers in the
I
I
I
I
i
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Houston area complained about his competitor's (Business
Electronics) prices and threatened Sharp that he would ter-
minate his relationship with Sharp if Sharp would not ter-
minate Business Electronics, the only competing dealer in
the Houston area. The Court reasoned that the challenged
conduct might have promoted consumer service and prevented
free riding and, therefore, did not violate the antitrust
law.110 However, the initial issue that should have been
asked, whether there was better service probable and whether
a free riding problem existed, were not considered.
Thus, the theory replaced the facts.111 Although an
"easy to use" theory promotes predictability, the
polymorphity and subtility of the law are disregarded by a
simplistic approach.
E. Alternatives for Antitrust Enforcement
To solve the existing dilemma, either the material law
must be amended or the procedural rules and enforcement
policy should change.112 A minimum reform would be to
provide the courts with a list of values to be protected
under the law.113 Providing a ranking of these values and
establishing evidentiary standards would greatly contribute
to clarity and predictability. Another solution would be to
limit the possibilities to challenge antitrust violations
both in the time114 and in the enforcer dimension.115 An
even more drastic solution would be to transfer antitrust
19
cases to specialized decision makers who are equipped to
employ an adequate and thorough antitrust analysis.~~6 These
decisionmakers would be able to employ a more sophisticated
and multivalued antitrust analysis.
1. Antitrust Enforcement in America
At present, in America a violation of the antitrust law
may be challenged by federal agencies,~~7 individuals,~~B
and states as "parens patriae" for their citizens.~~9 A jury
may have to decide the facts of the case. The decision is
made by an unspecialized judge dependent on the submitted
information.~2o Antitrust ligitation is lengthy and costly.
Only some few cases will be heard by the Supreme Court. This
procedure tends to create inconsistent rulings among the
courts and leads to makes the courts susceptible to applying
"easy to use methods".
2. Antitrust Enforcement in Germany
Under the GWB -- with a few exceptions~2~ -- enforce-
ment of the antitrust law is carried out by the Federal Car-
tel Authority. The Federal Cartel Authority is staffed with
highly qualified professionals, both lawyers and economists.
The GWB is the basis for antitrust enforcement; changes in
the political landscape do not have a considerable impact on
the enforcement policy. Consistency is favored. If an appeal
against a decision of the Federal Cartel Authority is filed,
a specialized Cartel Senate at the Court of Appeals for West
20
Berlin~22 will decide the case.~23 Final review is vested in
a Cartel Senate of the Supreme Court.
This concentration and specialization of decision
makers contributes to consistency and predictability and
thus enhances the rule of law.
Moreover, antitrust proceedings in Germany are fun-
damentally different from the proceeding in the United
States. Jury trials are unknown and pre-trial discovery
procedures do not exist under the GWB. The judge controls
the trial, preventing prohibitive ligitation costs. Also,
the rule that the losing party has to pay court costs, the
costs of witness' and expert's testimony, and the winner's
attorney fees contributes to prevent lengthy and costly an-
titrust proceedings.~24
The proceeding of the trial and the taking of proof is
controlled by the judge, both parties "offer" their wit-
nesses for the proof a certain fact, the judge decides which
witness's testimony is necessary to evaluate the conduct and
then decides which witness he wants to hear. The judge is
responsible for questioning the witness, and the parties may
ask additional questions.~25
F. Policy and Goals of the American Antitrust Law
The most important question regarding antitrust enfor-
cement is how to define what goals should govern application
of the law. Because of the importance of this issue, the
goals pursued by the antitrust law are clearly defined.
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However, under present law the search for an answer to this
question is daunting. The current discussion in America is
highly controversial. The vigorous debate reaches back to
vocabulary used in war scenario,126 during revolutions,127
and to describe football games.12B
The decision which opinion will prevail is of crucial
importance to application of antitrust law both in the area
of horizontal and of vertical restraints. The latter
restraints would be treated very favorably -- because of
their positive effects on interbrand competition129 -- if
the approach of the Chicago School should prevail. According
to the view of the Chicago School vertical restraints would
be only of antitrust concern if they have horizontal ef-
fects.
The conflicting views of the Chicago School and the New
Coalition do not reflect a scholastic dispute held in remote
ivory towers but have immediate impact on to day for day ap-
plication of the antitrust law. The vagueness of the lan-
guage of American antitrust law leaves broad discretion to
the courts and enables the courts to follow either view.
Thus, the outcome of a case does not only depend on the sub-
mitted facts but also on the measuring stick which the court
applies. This controversy has already lead to remarkable
confusion which is highly unsatisfying for all participants.
As a result, the rule of the law, which should guide busi-
nessmen and courts in their decisions is abandoned. The at-
tempt to solve this confusion has created several new
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approaches, tests, and filters intend to help determine what
conduct should be condemned by antitrust law.~30 However,
there are no indications that the facial problems of
American antitrust law will be solved in the near future.~3~
Therefore, it is necessary to explain both the "goals
of antitrust" according to the Chicago school and the "goals
of antitrust" according to the New Coalition.~32 Although it
seems too broad-ranging an analysis to extend the inquiry to
the core arguments of the conflicting theories if one is
merely interested in the outcome of an exclusive dealing or
price fixing case, a description of the general views is
necessary since these views are mirrored in the treatment of
every vertical restraint.~33
1. Approach of the Chicago school
The approach of the Chicago school is based on neoclas-
sical price theory~34 and assumes rational behavior of both
sellers and buyers.~35 According to the assumptions that
firms have the tendency to be efficient, that competition is
self-maintaining,~36 and that the exploitation of market
imperfections -- if there should 'be any -- will be prevented
because of the possibility of new market entrants, the
Chicago school asserts that the economy should be free from
governmental interference.
Proponents of the Chicago school's antitrust
analysis~37 narrow the goals of antitrust law down to a
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single question: whether a certain conduct is efficiency
creating.:l.38
The language of the antitrust statutes, their
legislative histories, the major structural fea-
tures of antitrust law, and considerations of the
scope, nature, consistency, and ease of ad-
ministration of the law all indicate that the law
should be guided solely by the criterion of con-
sumer welfare.
Moreover, the definition of consumer welfare is understood
as social welfare and neglects income distribution effects
by stating that "the shift in income distribution does not
lessen total wealth":l.39and thus "should be completely ex-
eluded from the determination of the antitrust legality of
the activity.":l.40
The Chicago School assumes that "[b]usiness efficiency
necessarily benefits consumers by lowering the costs of
goods and services or by increasing the value of the product
or services offered.":l.4:l.
Consumer welfare is measured by the criterion of economic
efficiency::l.42 Economic efficiency is comprised of alloca-
tive:l.43and productive efficiency.:l.44 According to the
Chicago School, the latter is mainly determined by economies
of scale and transaction-cost efficiencies.:l.45
Other goals are not accepted, a multiple-goal antitrust law
is expressly rejected.:l.46
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2. Treatment of Vertical Restraints under the Chicago
school's Theory
Although the arguments surrounding various vertical
restraints will be discussed later, a general statement of
the Chicago school's treatment of vertical restraints il-
luminates the basic setting. Based on the abovementioned
efficiency arguments combined with the assumptions that
businessmen behave rationally and market imperfections will
be corrected by the market, treatment of vertical restraints
becomes simple. Vertical restraints are no longer a subject
of antitrust concern because they are assumed to be ef-
ficiency enhancing.147 The Chicago School imputes that every
businessmen who employs a restraint wants to enhance effici-
ency because attempts to create market imperfections or
achieve monopoly power are unrealistic, "unless, of course,
they are irrationally willing to trade profits for posi-
tion".148
Consequently, the Chicago School takes the position
that "vertical price fixing, vertical market division, and,
indeed all vertical restraints are beneficial to consumers
and should for that reason be completely lawful."149
3. Criticism of the Chicago school's Approach
Opponents of the Chicago School's approach assert that
antitrust law pursues a multi-valued goal. They accuse the
Chicago School of ignoring the basic values of antitrust
law, ignoring the legislative history,150 displacing the
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process of proper legal analysis, and subserving of law to
ideology.~5~
Furthermore, they allege that the Chicago School theory
is based on irrational premises,~52 is underinclusive, and
is utterly artificial and oversimplifying.~53
The New Coalition is particularly concerned with the
influence the Chicago school's theory has gained on the
reasoning of the courts.~54
They recognize the problem of leaving discretion to the
courts in enabling judges who favor neoclassical economic
theory to repeal antitrust law.~55 They do agree,~56
however, with Chicago scholars that legislation should be
left to Congress and promote legislative action to clarify
the goals of antitrust law. Accordingly, the New Coalition
favors practical rules for the administration of antitrust
law, such as the proposal of the "Freedom of the Vertical
Price Fixing Act of 1987".~57
Regarding the role of economic theory in the applica-
tion of antitrust law, the New Coalition disagrees in two
essential points with the Chicago School's approach. First,
they reject the plain economic theory of the Chicago School
as a leading principle. Second, they subscribe to economic
theory the task of assisting the courts' reasoning, rather
than sacrificing antitrust law to economic theory.~5a Ac-
cordingly, the New Coalition argues that antitrust law
should be more concerned with process than outcome~59 and
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supports the view that the law should define the goals of
antitrust.~6o
For example, it makes a difference whether economic
theory is used to overcome a static reasoning such as in
Schwinn~6~ by showing that, in the absence of other negative
effects, certain vertical restraints may have procompetitive
effects and sound business justifications. Nonetheless,
economic theory gains a different quality if used to allow
vertical restraints without scrutiny of procompetitive and
other side effects.
4. Approach of the New Coalition
The New Coalition is not limited to criticising the
Chicago School. Rather, the New Coalition promotes its own
approach to antitrust law, centering on the goals of an-
titrust. The New Coalition contends that Congress pursued a
multivalued goal in enacting antitrust law.~62 Those scho-
lars argue that Congress was not even cognizant of the
Chicago School's efficiency concept at the time the Sherman
and Clayton Act were adopted.~63 They allege that
legislative history indicates that multiple goals were pur-
sued by Congress.~64 The New Coalition refers to the his-
torical background of antitrust law~65 to conclude that the
accumulation of economic power was a concern of the drafters
of antitrust law. According to the New Coalition, antitrust
law was created in an atmosphere of deep suspicion of the
accumulation of economic power.~66 Therefore, they assert
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that Congress had more in mind than establishing neoclassi-
cal price theory when enacting the Sherman Act. Moreover,
the New Coalition refers to substantial case law that sub-
scribes to a multivalued goal of antitrust. They point out
that Congress acquiesed to these decisions, making no effort
to reverse the rulings of the courts.
To ensure that the courts adhere to legislative intent
and to cure the present uncertainty, the New Coalition advo-
cates four distinct goals of antitrust. The purpose of pro-
scribing these goals is to limit judicial discretion accord-
ing to the legislative intent. The four goals are "(l)dis-
persion of economic power,(2) freedom and opportunity to
compete on the merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and
(4) protection of the competition process as a market gover-
nor".1G7
5. Treatment of Vertical Restraints According to the New
Coalition
It is not possible to give a description of "the"
treatment of vertical restraints under the New Coalition's
approach. The New Coalition consists of numerous scholars
who are united in their attempt to oppose the erosion of
antitrust law by the Chicago School. Thus, they may arrive
at different outcomes upon applying their united goals to
certain vertical restraints. 1GB Nevertheless, they do agree
that, in scrutinizing the lawfulness of vertical restraints,
several values must be weighed. Values such as freedom of
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the competitive process, maintenance of a viable market
structure, limiting economic power, benefit for the consumer
are universally included in their antitrust analysis.
According to the New Coalition intrabrand competition has a
value of its own.
G. Policy and Goals of the GWB
For a lawyer familiar with civil law systems the shift
in American antitrust enforcement is astounding. Although
the GWB is not ignorant of economic arguments, the role of
economic theory is significantly different. In Germany, con-
sideration of policy and economic arguments in evaluating
restrictive conduct is limited by statutory language and by
the objectives of the GWB.lG9 Under the German conception of
antitrust law, the most important step in approaching a
restraint is identifying the impact of that restraint on
values protected by ~he GWB. This evaluation has been made
by the lawmaker, the decisionmaker must accept this decision
and follow the statutory determination. If the statute
employs vague or ambiguous terms, these terms have to be in-
terpreted according to the goals of the law.
Protection of competition is the primary goal of the
GWB.l70 However, the term "competition" is not defined in
the GWB. Therefore, the interpretation of the term competi-
tion is crucial, and the evaluation of restrictive conduct
differs according to the values subsumed under the term
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competition. For example, the statement that the GWB
protects competition but not competitors~7~ might be mis-
leading if one does not know that according to the GWB's
notion of competition the freedom of competitors action is
essential.
The GWB has embraced a free market orientation which
was influenced by the neoliberalism of the ORDO, or Freiburg
School.~72 The scholars of the Freiburg School favor the
competitive system~73
because they consider it more efficient, but, per-
haps still more important, because they believe it
more democratic. They criticize purely economic
perspectives that separate economic well-being
from the issue of freedom. They reject a centrally
administered economy because they consider the
concentration of power to be inconsistent with
democratic principles. The neoliberals reject a
laissez-faire economy for related but different
reasons. They criticize laissez-faire positions,
both classical and more recent ones, for overlook-
ing the problems of limitation and control of
private economic power.
The framers of the GWB recognized that "optimal competition"
cannot be defined so as to deal effectively with every kind
of restrictive conduct. Hence, the GWB adopted the para-
meters of economic theory designed to optimize the competi-
tive concepts pursued by the GWB. The GWB also adopted legal
principles.
The GWB does not merely rely on economic theory
but also pursues legal, economic, and social policy
functions.~74 The legal policy function protects personal
freedom to make and negotiate contracts. The economic policy
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function is aimed at preserving an open and free market
place, for example, by combatting economic concentration.
The social policy function serves to distribute both income
and wealth, in part by softening undue differences in
economic power.175
According to its civil law heritage, the GWB attempts
to avoid employing vague standards such as the terms "con-
sumer welfare" and "economic efficiency" which may be used
to justify every restraint.176 Further, the GWB recognizes
"market performance" as only one of several policy goals.
Economic efficiency takes second place to freedom of
action.177 Mere reliance on "market performance" is con-
sidered to be to "single sided".17B Scholars point out that
evaluation of market performance depends on whether short or
long term analysis is applied.179 The GWB recognizes the
danger that an existing "imperfect" market structure might
be replaced an even "more imperfect" market structure, "bet-
ter performing" in the short run while having a pernicious
effect in the long run.1BO "Antidot is also poison."1B1
Therefore, to assure "freedom of competition" the GWB
relies mainly on "market conduct" and "market structure."1B2
GWB's policy is to protect overall freedom of competition by
ensuring open markets with a multitude of "free" market
participants and competition on different levels of dis-
tribution.1B3 Consequently, the GWB emphasizes the value of
intrabrand competition.1B4
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1. Alternative Approaches Discussed in Germany
The appropriate approach towards vertical restraint was
discussed before, during, and after the enactment of the
GWB. Often, arguments were borrowed from the Chicago School.
Some argued that restraints in single contractual relation-
ships cannot impair the freedom of competition. Other con-
tentions include that vertical restraints have a procompeti-
tive effect enhancing the competitive edge of some
businessmen and stimulating overall competition and that in-
terbrand competition should be the main concern of antitrust
law.~a5
To illuminate the underlying economic theory of the
GWB, it is helpful to discuss for what reasons the GWB
choose the present conceptions and why it rejected other
approaches. Of special interest is that theoretical concepts
embraced by the Chicago School were rejected by the GWB.
a. Concept of Perfect Competition
The perfect competition concept, the economic model of
neoclassic theory, is based on the notion of perfect per-
forming markets with unhindered competition on all levels of
distribution, between all market participants. Under this
model, all vertical restraints are suspect, because they
restrict freedom of individual market participants, thereby
tainting the "perfection". Consequently, restraints are have
to be considered per se illegal.~B6
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Although this concept had some influence on the GWB, it
is not accepted as leading concept in its application. The
German legal community has recognized that the underlying
assumptions of neoclassical theory, such as perfect and im-
mediate information of all market participants, fixed demand
structures of consumers, and immediate reaction on change,
are inadequate in practice.1B7 The drafters of the GWB, al-
though influenced by the neoclassic theory of perfect com-
petition, did not choose this theory as leading principle of
the GWB because it is based on irreal assumptions and there-
fore leads to results which do not comport with reality.
Practical experience with plain economic models highly
dependant on assumptions resulted in suspicion towards
economic theory. Therefore, the so called "second best
choice" was made. Thee GWB's drafters recognized that every
economic theory has shortcomings and that no theory was
suited to become the pole star of the Act's application.
Hence, economic theory is merely used to provide ideas and
guidance.
b. Workability Concept
Based on the treatises of J.A. Schumpeter1BB and J.M.
Clark,1B9 the dynamic elements of competition were more
focused on by the GWB. The German scholar E. Kantzenbach,19o
who influenced the 1965 amendment of the GWB, adopted the
workability theory. Kantzenbach's workability concept at-
tributed to competition not only the exercise of business
33
behavior, but also social values such as limitation and con-
trol of economic power, promotion of technological progress,
and increased allocative efficiency. According to this
theory the border where procompetitive conduct becomes an-
ticompetitive is determined by market structure, market con-
duct, and market performance tests.191 However, workability
concepts were not sufficient to define the parameters for
applying the GWB. The workability concept cannot solve the
conflict between market performance (efficiency) and market
structure (freedom of the markets) -- the so called "Dilemma
These".192 Another shortcoming of the workability concept is
the inability to harmonize static efficiency criteria with
dynamic market functions. Moreover, it is not possible to
determine how long competition can be considered as "work-
able",193 and it is not possible to compare future effects
on competition with and without restraint.194
A multitude of economic effects cannot be contained
within the limited scope of a workability concept dependent
from assumptions.195 The multivalent impact of vertical
restraints makes a workability analysis especially dif-
ficult.196 As long as no obvious abuse occurs, competition
can be considered workable.197 The workability concept does
not provide rules for a comprehensive evaluation to deter-
mine pro- or anticompetitive effects. Thus no optimal market
condition is defined under the workability concept. Argu-
ments alleging procompetitive effects, such as transactions
cost economics, increased interbrand competition, ease of
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market entry of smaller competitors, better service and
quality, and other efficiency arguments, are in opposition
to anticompetitive impacts such as loss of freedom, market
foreclosure effects, shift of income and economic power,
lessened consumer choice, decrease in price competition, and
other adverse impacts on consumers or market structure.~9a
Exact conclusions cannot be drawn. Therefore, any result
might be justified.~99 Thus, the ambiguity and vagueness of
the workability concept preclude its use as a sound basis
for a clear and predictable statute. Hence the GWB does not
follow the workability concept.200
c. Group Competition Concept
Parallel to the increased use of vertical restraints
and expansion of the "franchise idea," German scholars
developed the group competition concept. This theory is
mainly influenced by the Chicago School.20~ Therefore the
proponents of this concept are described as the "German
branch of the Chicago School".202
The group competition concept favors replacing the com-
petition among a multitude of small market participants203
with integrated distribution channels using uniform market-
ing strategies.204 The arguments supporting this conception
are the same as the Chicago School uses to support their
view that interbrand competition should be the main concern
of antitrust. Therefore, the arguments are wellknown to
someone familiar with the inter-/intrabrand dichotomy of
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American antitrust law. Efficiency arguments (allocative and
productive efficiency, transaction costs economics, and en-
hanced interbrand competition) are the central points of
theoretical concern.
However, proponents of the group competition concept
must restrain themselves on criticizing the current policy
of the GWB. The concept of group competition does not com-
port with the economic policy of the GWB.205 The GWB prefers
the competitive freedom of a multitude of individuals to
efficiency advantages which, according to the workability
theory, might be created through limiting individuals'
freedom. 206
GWB policy is to maintain free competition among all
market participants. The replacement of intrabrand competi-
tion with leadership by the manufacturer would lead to
central planning. Due to concentration, collusion, and other
market imperfections, the sovereignity of the consumer could
be replaced by dictatorship by the group leader.207 The con-
sumer's choice would be reduced to either accepting the pro-
duct of a group or not. Moreover, the group competition con-
cept conflicts with democratic principles laid down in the
Constitution.
Therefore, the group competition concept is rejected
and stamped as "ideological war against antitrust ... sup-
ported by industrie's interest~".20a
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2. Concept of the Practical Freedom of Competition
At present, the policy of the GWB and its interpreta-
tion by the courts and the Federal Cartel Authority is best
described as "theory of the practical freedom of competi-
tion''.209 This theory is based on the work of A. Smith2~o as
set forth by the theory of the Austrian School (L. von
Mises, F.A. von Hayek)2~~ and adopted in Germany by E.
Hoppmann.2~2
The practical freedom theory interprets competition as
an interactive process through which the individual market
participants are able to exercise their economic freedom.
This free competition notion is based on an absence of
coercion in the market place.2~3 This theory refers to com-
petition as an open and evolutionary process which allows
the individuals to use their creative potential while taking
chances in a competitive environment. Market conduct and
market structure are of primary concern; market performance
comes second.2~4
Three reasons support the view that the practical
freedom of competition theory is best suited to describe the
public policy of the GWB.
First, legislative history and the intent of the lawmakers
complies with this theory.2~5
Second, the practical freedom theory complies with the sta-
tutory, constitutional and civil law principles. The GWB
protects competition as a legal principle to ensure freedom
and egality of all subjects. This value is also recognized
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by the Constitution.216 The GWB relies on the assumption
that democratic principles and a high degree of freedom also
lead to good market performance. The principle task of the
GWB is to limit the individual's freedom to enter restric-
tive covenants when this freedom endangers the overall
freedom. The GWB recognizes that the freedom to conclude
contracts -- which is a prerequisite for free competition
can only considered to be a "freedom" as long markets are
not distorted. In a competitive environment, however, the
competitive pressure contributes to preserve the freedom to
enter contracts free from coercion.217
Third, GWB policy of concentrating on restrictions of the
individuals' freedom to compete makes the GWB practicable.
This limitation of the statutory scope makes it possible for
courts to concentrate on relevant parameters rather than
attempting to sort out the numerous facts connected in an
enormous multitude of interdependencies.218
The theory of practical freedom of competition focuses
on several dimensions of competitive freedom. These are
(l)freedom of the exchange process (exchangeability of
goods, cross elasticity), (2)freedom to use competitive
parameters, (3)freedom of consumer's choice, (4)openness of
the markets, and (5)freedom to design a distribution system.
Evaluation of a restraint's impact on freedom of the market
and of freedom of choice remaining, determines whether a
vertical restraint is undue. With regard to some restraints,
the statutory norm contains an abstract and anticipated
38
evaluation of the restraint (for example the prohibition of
resale price maintenance and does not allow further con-
sideration). Most of the vertical restraints, however, are
subject to limited iudicial discretion. This discretion,
however is limited because the courts have to follow the
intention of the applicable norm in the light of the goals
of the GWB.
As mentioned earlier, the GWB does not pursue the
"pure" theory of the practical freedom of competition. The
lawmakers included protection of small and middle-size
businessmen, consumer protection, and certain economic
policy goals (conjunctural, structural, and export policy)
in the catalogue of values protected under the GWB.219
However, one should not assume that the GWB pursues a wel-
fare approach or promotes "societal antitrust".22o
Rather, the GWB's main concern is preventing impairment of
freedom of competitive processes by economic power of other
market participants.221
Interestingly, under the theory of the practical
freedom of competition most vertical restraints escape con-
demnation under the GWB. Only resale price maintenance is
strictly prohibited. However, although the outcome the same
as under the Chicago School's approach, the result is
reached in a different way.
The Chicago School excuses vertical restraints because
of their positive effects on interbrand competition and
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believes that vertical restraints are only harmful to
competition if they effect interbrand competition.222
The GWB excuses vertical restraints because of their
.
probable business justification. In clear contrast to the
Chicago school's approach, the GWB protects "not only com-
petition as an institution'" but also emphasizes the value
of intrabrand competition thus the "individual members of
business are also of concern ...."223
Furthermore the GWB recognizes a danger to competition
caused by an increasing coverage of the market with in-
trabrand restraints. An increased coverage constitutes an
obstacle for new market entrants224 and might lead to in-
creasingly inflexible markets. These developments might harm
competitors, customers, and consumers, thereby leading to
results which the GWB tries to prevent.225
III. Resale Price Maintenance
The appropriate treatment of agreements restricting the
buyer's freedom to set his prices in contracts which he con-
cludes with third parties is probably the most hotly debated
issue in the area of vertical restraints among America's
legal scholars and courts.226 Although the Supreme Court
consistently upheld the per se rule against vertical resale
price maintenance,227 sometimes lower courts refused to fol-
low Supreme Court precedent.22B Moreover, the Department of
Justice, which is supposed to enforce antitrust law, refuses
to fulfil its task. Rather, the Department of Justice sup-
ports the Chicago School's view that the per se rule against
resale price maintenance should be abandoned.229
At the moment, it is not foreseeable which line of
reasoning of the courts will take and it is even doubtful
whether the per se rule against resale price maintenance
might survive if challenged before the Supreme Court. The
influence of the Chicago School on the courts and ad-
ministration is considerable and might lead to the
replacement of the per se rule against resale price
maintenance.
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The majority of Congress, on the other hand, supports a
more conservative approach towards antitrust.23o Through the
enactment of new legislation proscribing the courts how to
decide certain antitrust issues, Congress may reverse recent
judicial and administrative developments. For example, the
enactment of H.R. 585,231 the "Vertical Price-Fixing Act of
1987" would contribute to solving the present confusion and
establish clear standards in the area of vertical price
restraints.
In contrast, the per se rule232 against resale price
maintenance as codified in § 15 GWB233 declaring void all
restrictions of the buyer's freedom "to determine prices or
terms of business in contracts ... with third parties" is
not questioned by German scholars and is one of the most
vigorously enforced provisions of the GWB.
A. Treatment of Resale Price Maintenance under American An-
titrust Law
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons234 the
Supreme Court established the per se rule against resale
price maintenance, not permitting any excuse or justifica-
tion for such restraints. The Court addressed the injurious
effect of price fixing on public interest235 and upheld the
freedom of the buyer to set his prices.236 The Court stated
that, after the seller had "sold its products at prices
satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever
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advantage may be derived from competition in the subsequent
traffic."237
The per se rule was soon opposed by small wholesalers
and retailers who feared for their profit margins and for
their existence. Their lobbying effort, which was supported
by the economic environment of the Great Depression in the
1930's, was successful and, under the so called "Fair Trade"
laws,23B resale price maintenance agreements were exempted
from Sec. 1 Sherman Act condemnation. However, the unsatis-
fying experience239 with the "Fair Trade" laws increasingly
led to their limitation and finally to their repeal in
1975.240
Dr. Miles was reaffirmed in subsequent decisions,241
and the scope of per se condemnation under Sec. 1 Sherman
Act242 was extended to vertical maximum price fixing ar-
rangements.243 One of the most clear statements condemning
price restraints is contained in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil CO.244
The effectiveness of price-fixing agreements is
dependent on many factors, such as competitive
tactics, position in the industry, the formula
underlying price politics. Whatever economic jus-
tification particular price-fixing agreements may
be thought to have, the law does not permit an
inquiry in their reasonableness. They are all
banned because of their actual or potential threat
to the central nervous system of the economy.
At present, however, the per se rule against resale price
maintenance is weakened and challenged. The Supreme Court is
increasingly reluctant to assume a per se violation of the
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antitrust law.245 Based on the premise that "[a]ll vertical
restraints, ... , even those that result in substantial pro-
competitive benefits, may have some effects on price"246 the
scope of per se condemnation is narrowed.
Furthermore, American antitrust law requires proof of
concerted action as a prerequisite to challenging resale
price maintenance under Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act.247 The
Court stated in Fisher v. City of Berkeley24B that "[e]ven
where a single firm's restraints directly affect prices and
have the same economic effect as concerted action might
have, there can be no liability under § 1 in the absence of
agreement."249 Although the Court held in Sylvania250 that
"economic effects" rather than "formalistic line drawing"25~
should determine the treatment of a restraint, the
"conspiracy requirement" allows substantial conduct which
may have the same effect as resale price maintenance.252
Furthermore, the Court raised the evidentiary standards for
proof of the facts necessary to establish a price fixing
agreement or a conspiracy on a level which can be considered
prohibitive.253 As a result, the advantage of the per se
rule, its easy applicability and reliability is invalidated
through inpracticable standards. Under the present position
of the Supreme Cour~ there is hardly any chance for a plain-
tiff to prevail when alleging a price fixing conspiracy un-
less he can proof an explicit agreement to fix prices.
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1. Some Lower Court's Interpretations of the Per Se Rule
Some lower courts, however, have refused to follow the
Supreme Court's per se rule and pursued a more lenient
approach towards resale price maintenance.
For example, In Eastern Scientific Co. v. wild Heerbrugg In-
struments, Inc.254 a seller enforced a policy of territorial
restrictions by price maintenance restraints. The First Cir-
cuit interpreted the statement in Sylvania255 that "depar-
ture[s] from the rule of reason standard must be based on
demonstrable economic effect rather than ... formalistic
line drawing"256 in a way that illustrates the vagueness and
broad discretion under a rule of reason analysis in com-
parison to a per se standard. The Court held that the price
restraint was merely ancillary, accordingly, approached the
"ancillary price restraint" under a rule of reason analysis.
The Court stated that it was "unable to conceive of how the
resale price restrictions used to enforce the assigned
territories in the present case can possibly have a greater
anticompetitive effect than a pure policy of territorial
restrictions"257 and consequently upheld the price
restraint. However, if one follows this line of argumen-
tation every vertical price restraint could be subject to
rule of reason scrutiny, because, arguably, every price
restraint is less restrictive than vertical integration
which is basically allowed. Under this rationale, nothing
would be left of the policy behind the implementation of per
se rules, i.e. establishing clear and practicable standards
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and enabling the courts to condemn restraints without
"elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm ... caused [by the
restraints] or the business excuse for their use."25B
In Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp.259 the Supreme Court stated that distinguishing
between "naked" and "ancillary" as a means of classifying
vertical restraints is not appropriate because this would
lead to "perverse economic consequences ... to avoid per se
invalidity only through attachment to an express contractual
obligation. ,,260
The per se rule against resale price maintenance was
even further invalidated by the Ninth Circuit in 4ger Chev-
rolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,26~ where the Court
rejected application of the per se rule to an alleged verti-
cal price-fixing agreement and flatly stated "the principle
that allegations of vertical price-fixing are generally
evaluated under the 'rule of reason' rather than [being]
considered to be per se antitrust violations."262 However,
the cited principle was "discovered" by the Ninth Circuit,
ignoring the repeatedly affirmed per se rule and the Supreme
Court's holding in Monsanto.263 Monsanto was decided only
two years before 4ger Chevrolet and, apparently the Ninth
Circuit wanted to promote its own approach towards resale
price maintenance.
These decisions illuminate the state of confusion
prevailing in the area of vertical restraints under American
antitrust law. Ambiguous and vague terms, broad discretion
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left to the courts, unpractical evidentiary standards, and
insecurity about the role of economic theory led to incon-
sistent ruling and indicate the need for legislative action.
2. The Colgate Doctrine
The present struggle for the right approach towards
resale price maintenance is even more astonishing if one
considers that the Colgate doctrine264 gives sellers a
powerful tool to coerce their customer to adhere to their
pricing scheme.
a) The Economic Impact of Colgate
As Henry J. Hyde points out "[i]n today's name brand
economics in which many manufacturers pre-sell and differen-
tiate their products through national advertising, the loss
of supplies will almost certainly mean lost profits and
possibly the loss of the entire business."265 Therefore, the
threat to terminate a price cutter will have its impact on
the price cutter's pricing behavior. Another way to
establish a stable pricing scheme is to terminate price cut-
ters in favor of dealers which adhere to the suggested
pricing scheme. This firm policy, especially when it is
announced in advance and vigorously enforced, will lead to
stable and higher prices. Discounters will often not start
to carry the products of the offending manufacturer, because
they will face termination and loss of "investment" in
taking the products of this manufacturer into their
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program.266 On the other hand, high price stores will be
attracted by this policy, they can rely on the manufac-
turers' termination of "price cutters" upon complaint and
protection from price competition.267
Therefore, the initiative to terminate a price cutter
frequently comes from the dealers who often use their posi-
tion to induce the manufacturer to impose an "enforced"
pricing scheme.
In conclusion, the Colgate rationale that only formal
restraints constitute an agreement and, hence, are per se
illegal resale price maintenance, is a formalism which
contradicts Sylvania's reasoning that the "economic effect"
should be decisive. The fact that economic pressure of
powerful firms is as stringent and effective as a contrac-
tual obligation is ignored by Colgate.26B
b) The Problem of Limiting Colgate's Impact
Under the Colgate doctrine,269 the problem becomes
drawing a practicable and appropriate borderline between
unilateral and bilateral conduct. Courts recognized that
harmful conspiracies may escape antitrust liability.
Accordingly, the scope of Colgate was limited. In United
States v. Parke Davis & Co. 270 the so-called "plus factor'l
was developed and every conduct which exceeded the announce-
ment of policy and withdrawal of trade was held to constitu-
te an invalid resale price maintenance agreement.271 In
Parke Davis272 the Court limited the scope of Colgate so far
-
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that almost every dealer termination put the terminating
manufacturer into jeopardy of a treble damage suit.
Only conduct "of such Doric simplicity as to be some-
what rare in this day of complex business enterprise"273 was
held able to escape condemnation under antitrust law. The
problem, however, was that, on the one hand, business con-
duct of "doric simplicity" hardly exists, while on the other
hand, Colgate was upheld. Therefore, the antitrust law be-
came trapped between simplicity and complexity. It is hardly
logical to explicitly allow a business conduct (as Colgate
does) and afterwards punish the businessmen who relies on
the approved rule when this business conduct is applied in
real world business.274 A look at the business world reveals
that communication between seller and buyer is normal and
desired business conduct and should not be deterred.275
c) Colgate's Adoption to "Real World Business"
Courts realized this problem and broadened the allowed
conduct under Colgate. In subsequent decisions, particularly
in dealer termination cases, the courts changed their
approach, amending plaintiff's standard of proof rather than
abolishing the rule which does not fit into real world busi-
ness.
However, the courts missed the opportunity to find a
compromise between allowing legitimate business conduct and
prohiibiting too much anticompetitive conduct. Instead of
establishing different levels of presumptive illegality, the
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proof of a vertical conspiracy is almost impossible after
Monsanto276 and Business Electronics.277 The plaintiff
alleging a price conspiracy faces two obstacles. First, the
proof of a conspiracy requires an evidentiary standard not
known in other areas of the law.278 It is particularly dif-
ficult to meet this evidentiary burden. Hence, the amorphous
question of whether the termination was the result of an
illegal conspiracy or independent decision is further im-
peded, because the interests of manufacturer and dealer in
establishing a certain pricing scheme often go hand in hand.
Second, even if the plaintiff can submit convincing facts for
at least a prima facie assumption, the Court might not con-
sider the facts but, rather, might reject plaintiff's claim
with the flat statement that a price fixing conspiracy is not
probable. Thus, economic theory provides alternative reasons
for conduct -- without considering whether these reasons have
bee submitted in the case before the court.279
Therefore, if one pursues the notion that resale price
maintenance violates antitrust law, one has to admit that, as
long as the Colgate doctrine is not overruled, the
achievement of the goals of Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act is
hindered and restricted by Colgate. Under Colgate the border-
line between "normal" business conduct and "conspiracy" is
hardly definable with the predictability a statute imposing
criminal sanctions requires. Moreover, the coalition of Col-
gate and economic theory is increasingly becoming an obstacle
to antitrust enforcement.
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B. Resale Price Maintenance under the GWB
Until the 1973 amendment of the GWB resale price main-
tenance for brand products was allowed.2Bo At the time of
the abolition of resale price maintenance, about 174,000 ar-
ticles were registered as being subject to resale price
maintenance.2B1 At present only books, due to cultural
political reasons, are exempted from the prohibition.2B2 The
change in the law was motivated by the idea that resale price
maintenance did not any longer fit in the economic en-
vironment of the 70's with strong and competitive retail out-
lets and more educated and flexible consumers.2B3 The inten-
tion of the lawmaker in amending § 15 GWB was to foster the
goals of the GWB and to promote the freedom of competition.
It was recognized that resale price maintenance is not in
conformity with the GWB's policy of maintaining as much com-
petition as possible through enabling every enterprise to use
as much competitive parameters as possible. The GWB feared
that resale price maintenance might lead to misallocations
and shifting of wealth as result of centralizing the decision
as to the most important parameter "price".2B4
Indeed, the prohibition of resale price maintenance
resulted in a perceivable reduction of consumer prices.2B5
Another expected result of the amendment was an increased
concentration on the retail level. However, the "concentra-
tion wave" was not that massive,2BG and the abolishment of
51
resale price maintenance was only one of several reasons for
the increased concentration.zB7
Interestingly the GWB pursues a different policy towards
the per se rule than American antitrust law. Unlike the ten-
dency of the American courts to reduce the application of per
se rules, the GWB displays a tendency towards extending the
reach of the per se rule. The key norm against resale price
maintenance is safeguarded by other norms to prevent circum-
vention of the per se prohibited conduct. And vertical non-
price restraints, which are likely to reach a result which
resembles resale price maintenance, will also be prohibited.
For example, selective distribution systems which intend to
maintain a price level will be outlawed under the applicable
provision dealing with selective distribution because § 15
GWB shadows the whole area of vertical restraints.zBB In par-
ticular, the Colgate doctrinezB9 is clearly rejected by the
GWB.
1. The Key Norm -- § 15 GWB
§ 15 GWB is the key norm of the GWB's prohibition of
resale price maintenance. § 15 GWB provides that:z90
Agreements between enterprises with respect to
goods or commercial services ... shall be null and
void, insofar as they restrict a party to them in
its freedom to determine prices or terms of busi-
ness in contracts which it concludes with third
parties in regard to the good supplied, other
goods, or commercial services.
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The primary and emphasized purpose of § 15 GWB is to
protect freedom of contract and to protect third parties
from restraints imposed by the seller.29~ Indirectly, the
freedom of competition as an institution is also protected.
Another goal mentioned to gather support for the 1973 amend-
ment was fighting inflation; however, this goal does not fit
in the list of values protected by the GWB and is ex-
plainable only by the economic climate of that time.292
§ 15 GWB protects the freedom to enter contracts against
direct and indirect restrictions. Minimum and maximum price
fixing and all other kinds of restrictions affecting
prices293 violate § 15 GWB. Even "most favorable treatment-
clauses"294 are considered to constitute an illegal attempt
to circumvent § 15 GWB.
According to the underlying GWB policy -- maintaining
the competitive process as a way of ensuring good perfor-
mance rather than to relying on performance standards --
every price restriction is suspect under § 15 GWB. § 15 GWB
intends to maintain competition on all levels of distribu-
tion and to foster the GWB policy of preserving as much
freedom of competitive action as possible. Every restriction
in the use of competitive parameters constitutes an obstacle
to that goal.295
According to the legal conception of the GWB,29G the
interbrand/intrabrand discussion and workable competition
arguments are preempted from consideration.297 The rigid
treatment of resale price maintenance in comparison to other
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restraints, which are more favorably treated although their
economic effect might be the same, emphasizes the special
value the GWB contributes to the individuals' freedom to
freely set prices and conditions in its contracts with third
parties. Both the democratic value of freedom of the in-
dividual and the fact that prices are the core of competi-
tion are reflected in § 15 GWB.29B
2. Closing the Loopholes
Because of the clear and unambiguous language of § 15
GWB a direct violation of § 15 GWB will rarely occur.
However, the GWB suspects that businessmen are persis-
tently lured into attempting to mitigate or circumvent the
impact of § 15 GWB by construing new ways of distribution or
using other means than contractual agreements to assure ad-
herence to a certain pricing scheme. To foreclose other ways
to reach the same or similar results as prohibited under §
15 GWB, additional provisions of the GWB safeguard § 15 GWB
and close off other avenues which might be used to induce or
to coerce distributors to follow a proposed pricing
scheme. 299
a) § 25(2) GWB
In § 25(2) GWB, the statute explicitly d~clares that
"[e]nterprises ... shall not threaten or cause harm, or
promise or grant advantages, to other enterprises for the
purpose of inducing them to adopt conduct which, ... must
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not be made the subject-matter of a contractual commit-
ment."300 Threatening to refuse to deal, threatening to ter-
minate a discounter if he does not follow a pricing scheme,
threatening with any other economic disadvantages, or
promising economic advantages, constitutes an illegal at-
tempt to circumvent § 15 GWB.30:L The fact that the "refusal
to sell" is a commonly used strategy to circumvent the
prohibition of resale price maintenance is illustrated in
the OECD Report "Refusal to sell":302
Experience has shown that refusal to sell is the
most persuasive means employed by supplier to en-
force prescribed resale prices if the buyer has
not observed the prescribed prices. It is pointed
out ... that a supplier may circumvent the legal
prohibition of resale price maintenance (... ) by
withholding supplies from a distributor who is
reselling his goods at a lower price than he
thinks reasonable. He may also refuse to have
business relations with a particular distributor
because he has reason to believe that this dis-
tributor will sell his goods at reduced prices.
§ 25(2) GWB refers to the "real business world" and recog-
nizes that the effect of explicit resale price maintenance
might also be achieved by the means of reward or by applying
pressure in assuring adherence to a certain pricing scheme.
(1) Enforcement of § 25(2) GWB
The Federal Cartel Authority closely supervises any
business conduct which might be prone to influence the con-
tractual freedom of buyers. Three examples illustrate how
strict § 25(2) GWB is enforced.
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(2) Case Architektenkammer
In Architektenkammer303 a professional organization of
architects tried to establish that architects only charge
fees at the upper end of the pricing scale. Architects who
charged lower prices were threatened by the announcement of
"legal consequences." The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) decided
that this threat was intended to influence architects to
retreat from price competition and, accordingly upheld a
cease and desist order of the Cartel Authority of Lower
Saxony.304 Defenses were not accepted by the BGH.
(3) Case Uhren Kramer v. Seiko
Uhren Kramer v. Seiko305 has some similarities with
Monsanto and Business Electronics and deals with conduct
which is within the scope of the Colgate doctrine. Kramer, a
distributor for watches and other jewelry ordered watches
from Seiko. Seiko refused to fulfil this order, and Kramer
sued for delivery. Kramer claimed that the refusal was
motivated by Seiko's fear that Kramer would not adhere to
Seiko's pricing scheme and that Seiko wanted to avoid
trouble with other retailers that charged higher prices.
The Kammergericht (Courts of Appeals in Berlin) found
that Seiko's refusal to sell was based on the price cutting
of Kramer because Seiko had promised delivery if Kramer
would adhere to Seiko's suggested retail prices. The com-
bination of economic disadvantage, "non-delivery" in the
case of price cutting, and the economic advantage of
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"delivery" by adherence to the suggested pricing scheme
resulted in an attempt to restrict Kramer's freedom to set
his prices. Therefore, Seiko's conduct violated § 25(2) GWB.
Although in this case Seiko would have been free not to
deal with Kramer at all, Seiko's attempt to influence price
behavior was the fact which triggered the application of
§ 25(2) GWB.
One might argue that Seiko made only the mistake of un-
veiling its reason for non-delivery. If Seiko had not
delivered but had not attempted to influence Kramer's pric-
ing behavior, Seiko would not have violated § 25(2) GWB. The
GWB recognizes that a seller is generally306 free to choose
his customers. Although some price related conduct may es-
cape condemnation because of this GWB stance, most harmful
conduct is within the reach of the GWB. In most cases, a
seller who is not interested in loosing a customer will
attempt to give at least a "hint" that the customer's pric-
ing behavior might lead to termination. If subsequently the
dealer is actually terminated, the court has to inquire into
the motivation for termination (or non-delivery). Contrasted
to the problems addressed in Monsanto307 and Business
Electronics,30B evaluation of the motivation does not create
more problems than determining intent in other cases. Like
in every other case the court, i.e. the deciding judges,
will have to consider the factual setting and must analyze
and weigh the evidence. As seen in Uhren Kramer v. Seiko,309
the fact that a seller promises delivery to a retailer if
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certain prices will be charged strongly indicates that
§ 25(2) GWB has been violated.
b) § 26(1) GWB
§ 26(1) GWB opposes another way to circumventing the
per se rule against resale price maintenance. Furthermore,
the per se prohibition of boycotts in the meaning of § 26(1)
GWB310 also illuminates the value which the GWB contributes
to the freedom of third entities to competing without being
unfairly hindered by other enterprises. The GWB does not
only prohibit any attempt of an enterprise to inducing
another enterprise to adopting conduct which is prohibited
by the GWB311 -- particularly resale price maintenance
but also condemns arrangements involving three parties when
one party tries "to incite another enterprise ... to refuse
to sell or purchase with intent to unfairly harm certain
enterprises".312 The economic importance of secondary
boycotts is documented in the OECD Report "Refusal to
Sell":313
Cases are becomimg increasingly frequent of tradi-
tional dealers and specialized shops threatening
to discontinue the distribution of the supplier's
product if he delivers to discounters, chainsto-
res, department stores or other non-traditional
retailers. With this policy the traditional
dealers tend to hinder the appearance or develop-
ment of new forms of distribution which are fre-
quently more efficient from the productivity point
of view than the more conservative forms. The
former operate largely on the basis of lower
labour costs and prices achieved through self-ser-
vice and other rationalization methods.
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The so-called "secondary boycott"3:L4 constitutes in
most cases a violation of § 26(1) GWB. The mere attempt of
the inducing firm to hindering a third firm is suspect to
the GWB. Therefore, the inducing firm has to prove that its
"boycott initiative" is justified. It is not sufficient of
showing that the "boycott initiative" was not price motiva-
ted.
C. The Approach of the GWB and the American Dispute
The GWB decided to apply a strict per se rule against
resale price maintenance. Moreover, the GWB pursues a policy
of extending the scope of per se condemnation to other con-
duct which is relevant to prices. According to the policy of
the GWB, freedom of action is focused on, while efficiency
arguments are of secondary concern. Another argument against
resale price maintenance typical of the GWB's approach is
the assertion that it is arguably more democratic to leave
the pricing decision on the dealer level.
Although resale price maintenance is prohibited under
American antitrust law, the American approach towards price
related conduct is more lenient than the German and courts
are increasingly likely to allow price related conduct to
escape condemnation. In America, courts are increasingly
relying on the economic theory of the Chicago school which
holds that price relevant conduct and resale price main-
tenance are aimed at achieving efficiency and promoting
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consumer welfare and are not intended to raise prices
without efficiency gain.3~s
1. The Economic Arguments
The discussion among American courts and scholars
reflects again the controversial standpoints of the Chicago
School and the New Coalition.
a) The Chicago School's Approach
Scholars of the Chicago Schoo13~6 argue that resale
price maintenance increases distributive efficiency.3~7 Al-
though the Chicago School recognizes that the competition
between dealers is restricted, they conclude that the per se
rule is inappropriate. Thus they might suppress beneficial
effects, such as presale services. According to the Chicago
School, firms employing vertical restraints are attempting
to overcome market imperfections, such as the "free rider"
problem, rather than to exploit consumers. The Chicago
School alleges that the consumer benefits despite higher
price, because the additional sales services work in favor
of consumers. According to the Chicago School the price in-
crease is matched by additional services. The argument that
resale price maintenance may constitute an exercise of
market power is rejected because, according to the Chicago
School, the exercise of market power is unlikely. The
Chicago school disregards newer economic acknowledgments3~B
and empirical studies,3~g and asserts that, based on
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neoclassical economic theory -- as well as several assump-
tions with regard to market behavior and rationality of
market participants -- anticompetitive effects are not like-
.
ly. Under the Chicago School's analysis, intrabrand competi-
tion has no specific virtue and is only considered in the
context of possible effects on interbrand competition, such
as the facilitation of cartelization. However, the Chicago
School believes that cartelization is not probable; hence
foreclosure effects are neglected and, in the absence of
entry barriers, new market entrants maintain the competitive
pressure. Other effects on competition besides the efficien-
cy argument are not considered.320
b) The View of the New Coalition
The members of the New Coalition do not believe in this
benign effect and, therefore, favor antitrust law as a means
of controling the businessmen. The New Coalition casts doubt
about the seller's motivation and addresses the problems of
market power and entry barriers. They assert that resale
price maintenance may be used to shift income from consumer
to sellers, to take advantage of market imperfections, 'to
cement market power, to raise entry barriers, and to guise a
dealer cartel. According to this view resale price main-
·tenance makes the market less competitive and contribute to
seller's wealth rather than consumer's benefit.32~
The critics concentrate more on possible harmful effects of
resale price maintenance, such as higher prices322 and the
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fact that resale price maintenance has the same effect as a
dealer cartel.323 Also, the New Coalition emphasizes the
value of intrabrand competition, pointing out that vertical
resale price maintenance may have substantial effects on
interbrand competition324 by facilitating cartelization or
enabling so called conscious parallelism.325 Another argu-
ment which is also emphasized by the German GWB is the deci-
sion to support freedom of the individual according to the
free and democratic system which establishes the basic
values of the business environment. Therefore, the GWB sees
no need to amend its approach as long as economic theory
does not show that convincing reasons (in light of the GWB's
policy) which urge the lawmaker to consider a different ap-
proach.
2. Economic Arguments with Regard to Resale Price Main-
tenance
An analysis of the economic arguments in favor of a
more lenient approach towards resale price maintenance il-
lustrates the problems of how to determine the economic ef-
fects of resale price maintenance. Furthermore the analysis
could help to answer the question whether -- from an purely
economic standpoint -- the per se rule should be abandoned.
The next question will be -- assuming that economic argu-
ments support the view that the per se rule against resale
price maintenance should be abolished -- whether other
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non-economic arguments are convincing enough to uphold the
per se condemnation.
a) Market Transparency Argument
It is alleged that uniform prices increase market
transparency and, therefore, benefit competition and the
consumer by reducing information costS.326
However, the argument that the consumer benefits be-
cause he does not have to shop around for the "best price"
can be easily rejected because it is the consumer's choice
whether he wants to buy at the next best dealer or whether
to evaluate the market.327 For advertising purposes it is
sufficient to quote a price range or a suggested retail
price because this price would be almost the same price as
the fixed price. Only advertising with maximum prices might
justify a different treatment.32B
One must take into consideration that resale price
main~enance leads to higher prices so that the average con-
sumer has to pay more for the product.329 Therefore, it can-
not be said that the consumer is better off by saving infor-
mation costs (if any) when he has to pay more but can be
sure that he has to pay the same (higher) price at every
outlet. Moreover, the information cost benefit is opposed by
increased control costs to the manufacturer.
Another anticompetitive effect of "enhanced transparen-
cy" is that interbrand competition might be negatively
affected. Interestingly, a result which is supported by
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economic theory -- that market transparency contributes to
"perfect competition" -- was ignored by the "real business
world" which is operating in an imperfect environment. For
example, so called "open price systems" led to higher prices
instead of fostering price competition.330
Economic theory describes several situations where in
imperfect markets, such as oligopolies resale price main-
tenance may harm interbrand competition and lead to higher
prices and increased price inflexibility:33~ l)A manufac-
turer cartel could be more easily established; thus, the
discipline of the cartel members could be better controlled
and the cartel would not be disturbed by price cutters;
2)So-called "price signaling" would be facilitated.
Generally, anticompetitive behavior in oligopolistic markets
would be eased.
Price leadership332 and conscious parallelism could be exer-
cised without being disturbed by intrabrand competition.
The Chicago School's theory asserts that these effects
are not probable. However, their view is based on some
idealistic assumptions, such as absence of market power and
entry barriers.333
b) Ease of Market Entry
Some economists argue that resale price maintenance may
facilitate market entry of a new producer if the new market
entrant can guarantee his dealers a safe profit margin. The
dealer will be encouraged to strengthen his efforts to sell
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the product334 because his profit is "guaranteed" and not
endangered by price cutters (or free riders).335
On the other hand, the danger exists that dealers who
are not interested in selling at low prices will concentrate
their sales efforts on products with high profit margins.336
The customer, therefore, will be offered the high margin
product instead of a perhaps better and/or cheaper product
which is not that profitable for the dealer.
Moreover, a question remains as to how long a new
market entrant should be allowed to use resale price main-
tenance. Furthermore, to the extent that the products of new
market entrants are not exposed to intrabrand price competi-
tion, the overall competition will be distorted.
Another argument is that it is not necessary to
sacrifice the dealer's freedom to set prices because the new
market entrant can choose other ways to win retailers for
his product, such as territorial restraints.
c) Protection of the Small and Middle Size Businessmen
The "protection of small and middle-size businessmen"
argument was used during the "Fair Trade law movement" in
America and is permanently raised by German dealer associa-
tions. However, after the experience with·"Fair Trade" laws
the "protection" argument is not very popular in America
anymore.337 Also, the GWB did not accept that resale price
maintenance is necessary to protect small and middle size
businessmen.33B The GWB decided to protect the competitive
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process with free price competition, even if this competi-
tion leads to the elimination of some smaller, less effi-
cient dealers.339 Economists argue that, otherwise, the con-
sumer would have to support inefficient dealers with higher
prices. Furthermore, resale price maintenance does not
necessarily protect smaller and mid-size dealers because
bigger chain stores have developed their own brands (so
called "dealer brands") which allowed them to avoid resale
price maintenance. While these bigger dealers were able to
pursue their own price policy, smaller dealers were forced
to charge the prescribed price and were dependent on the
price policy of their supplier.340 A similar effect is
created by resale price maintenance on the manufacturer
level. Bigger manufacturers can use their market power in
combination with resale price maintenance to suppress
smaller competitors.341
d) Free Rider Argument
The argumentation of the Chicago School supporting
resale price maintenance concentrates on the so called "free
rider" argument. Hence, according to the Chicago School the
only reason for a manufacturer to use vertical restraints is
the strive for efficiencYi342 every restraint must have an
economic justification. With regard to resale price main-
tenance, the free rider argument is preeminent. Other
efficiency justifications of the Chicago School, such as
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transaction costs economics,343 are not that important in
the area of price restrictions.
Chicago scholars assert that resale price maintenance
serves the consumer by enhancing consumer services. The con-
sumer is insured of getting the information and services he
wants. The "free ride" which "price cutters" could take on
other, service providing dealers would be prevented.344
Likewise, other investments, e.g. advertising efforts would
be protected from unfair free riding.
Moreover, the Chicago School alleges that vertical
restraints, especially resale price maintenance, may improve
product quality and safety.
The Chicago School rejects arguments that less in-
trabrand competition may lead to supra-competitive prices
and may also lessen interbrand competition with its economic
theory. That economic theory is based on the following as-
sumptions: (l)markets are perfectly competitive and manufac-
turers are not able to create or to take advantage of market
imperfections, and unable to escape the competitive pressure
of markets; the only reason manufacturers introduce resale
price maintenance is to replace price competition with ser-
vice competition, not to lessen overall competition;345
(3)because the manufacturer's interest is to sell higher
quantities, he will not raise his prices in excess of the
service costs because otherwise the consumer would switch to
substitutes; (4)the threat of new market entrants helps to
----------
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maintain the competitive pressure which prevents the
manufacturers from overcharging.
However, the free rider argument has its shortcomings.
On the one hand, it is not guaranteed that consumer services
will improve when price competition is restrained. Especial-
ly fringe dealers may tend to cheat on the quality of ser-
vice.346 On the other hand merely focusing on the "free
ride" notion may lead to a "reversed free ride" problem.
This problem arises when the consumer does not want the ser-
vices but nevertheless has to pay for them. It should also
be recognized that the service argument applies only for
products which need pre-sale service but that restraints are
often applied to all kinds of products.
Additionally a free ride might be not probable for
another reason. The reputation of a brand name must be
transferable from the "service providing dealer" to the
"price cutter". Otherwise a free ride is not probable. 347
The free ride argumentation is opposed by convincing
arguments. It is pointed out that the efficiency argument of
the Chicago School focusing on the free rider problem ig-
nores another, much more probable efficiency. Resale price
maintenance would prevent to pass the efficiencies of more
efficient dealers on to the consumers. Moreover the dealer's
incentive to gain efficiency by reducing its transaction
costs or aChieving transaction cost economics by enabling
the efficient dealers to sell more at lower prices may be
reduced by fixed prices. These dealers are prevented from
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using the most important parameter "price" for competitive
means.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the higher
profit margin will be passed on to the consumer in the form
of higher quality and better services. Rather, the higher
profit margin may be used to raise entry barriers if, for
example, the additional profit is invested in advertising
and other measures which create preferences for the product.
Establishing product preferences might decrease price elas-
ticity for the product and result in further price in-
creases,34B so called "rent seeking".349 Because of rent
seeking, the consumer might be "coerced" to buy a product
which was pushed into the market and has established its
market position by strategic marketing of a powerful firm,
without regard for better quality or lower prices. The con-
sumer is not "better off" if he has to buy a heavily adver-
tised product at a higher price. The lawmaker of the GWB
stated:350
Abandoning price competition enables enterprises
which are willing to employ resale price main-
tenance to refer to surrogate forms of competition
such as product differentiation and competition in
the service dimension, leading to luxury packag-
ing, increased advertising etc., which are not
always appreciated by the customer. These and
similar measures of competition often contradict
the principle of economic reasonableness and are
not sufficient to grant manufacturers and dealers
the right to introduce resale price maintenance.
Likewise, improved product quality and safety are not
necessarily be accomplished by resale price maintenance.
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If, for example, the manufacturer can rely on the sales
efforts of his outlets, he may increase advertisement ef-
forts instead of improving product quality. In this case,
the manufacturer may have little incentive to improve his
products.
Higher prices are not an effect that is considered to
indicate good market performance and are hardly likely to
increase consumer welfare (in the sense that the buyer pays
less for a product). Moreover, the argument that higher
prices or supracompetitive prices are not likely because new
market entrants will be attracted is not convincing.
Several arguments support the view that the price under
resale price maintenance -- even when considering the addi-
tional services -- will be higher than the average price
without resale price maintenance. First, the price which 1S
fixed by the manufacturer is orientated in the cost struc-
ture of the average or less than average dealer. Therefore,
the fixed price does not reflect the efficiency advantage of
the above average dealers.35~ Second, the manufacturer does
not know how much the services cost the dealer and, accord-
ingly, the higher price is not necessarily outweighed by
better services. Again, the cost advantage of more efficient
dealers is disregarded.352 Third, fixed prices are, in
general, less flexible in responding to price changes.
Therefore, the consumer profits later from the competitive
pressure on the market.353
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Furthermore, "perfect competition" exists only as a
model ("all other things being equal"),354 and in "real"
markets every enterprise has a certain freedom to lower or
raise its prices without attracting new market entrants even
if marginal entry barriers exist.355 Moreover, economic
analysis of the function and importance of entry barriers
has not reached a stage where accurate predictions are pos-
sible of what factors constitute entry barriers and of what
obstacles they pose for new market entrants.356
The Chicago school's approach to entry barriers is a
major shortcoming in that school's theory. The Chicago
School ignores market realities357 and fails to properly ad-
dress the problems of market imperfection, such as exter-
nalities and strategic market conduct. Furthermore, the
Chicago School ignores the differences between short and
long term performance.35B
3. Evaluation of the Economic Arguments
As the foregoing discussion exposes every economic ar-
gument can be opposed by a counterargument. Certain effects
may be the result of an ascertained cause; but, the effects
must not necessarily occur.
Nonetheless, arguments favoring freedom of price com-
petition are better suited than other theories thus far ex-
plaining real world business. Moreover, price competition is
the core of competition, and substitutes for price competi-
tion cannot prevent a certain loss of competitiveness.
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First, quality and service competition is not as measurable
as price competition and is often used to hide price com-
petition.359 Second, price is the only parameter which can
be quickly and easily adapted to market changes. Third, ex-
perience teaches us that resale price maintenance generally
leads to higher prices, not fully compensated for by addi-
tional services. Fourth, the power to set prices is shifted
from dealers to manufacturers, taking an essential freedom
from the dealer. Restricting this freedom could result in
restricted dealers bearing the risk of running a business
with the freedom of an agent. This fourth argument has been
neglected by the Chicago School, but it must be considered
if one does not want to sacrifice multivalued legal
reasoning to plain economic theory.36o
Moreover, one should consider that manufacturers are
not helpless "victims" of "free riders". Under both the
American and German legal system the seller is free to im-
pose contractual obligations proscribing pre and post sales
services, adequate presentation, and qualification of sales-
persons. The manufacturer is also free to employ a selective
distribution system to ensure adequate presentation of its
products.36~
4. Effects not Included in the Efficiency Analysis
Furthermore, non- efficiency related and non-economic
effects of resale price maintenance oppose the implementa-
tion of a more lenient approach towards resale price
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maintenance. Both the freedom of the dealer to set his
prices and the freedom of the buyer to choose between price
competing outlets are values which comply with the goal to
maintain a decentralized economic order with a multitude of
independent businessmen. The freedom of the individual
dealer to strive for business by offering a competitive
price is an important part of democracy. Both dealers' and
customers' freedom can be restricted by powerful manufac-
turers that have the power to withdraw their product from
price competition, enabling them to impair the freedom of
competition. Freedom of competition, however, is a basic
value of the political order of both the American and German
democratic systems.
5. Legal Method Argument
The per se rule in German antitrust law is also sup-
ported for legal policy reasons. As the approach of § 15 GWB
shows, the GWB left the responsibility to decide about this
important issue with the legislature. The Federal Cartel
Authority and the German courts accept this decision and
vigorously enforce it. Economic considerations do not come
into play, and no discretion is left to the courts.362 The
German business community has accepted the statutory regula-
tion and abides it. The advantages of this strict rule are
that predictability prevails, costly and lengthy ligitation
is prevented, and the rule of law is promoted.363 As long as
there is no obvious need to abandon the present state of the
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law the lawmaker should resist tendencies to subsitute a
reliable and predictable rule with a more ambiguous and
vague rule. And even if economic theory could prove that
beneficial conduct is more than occasionally suppressed, the
law should not be changed drastically. For example, case
groups, such as an rule of reason in the case of maximum
price fixing, could be developed. Moreover, the per se rule
could be softened by a rule of reason with presumptive
illegality. The seller would have the burden of proof be-
cause the seller should best know why he employed the
restraint.
Another way to create predictability is illustrated by
the GWB choice with regard to cartels: § 1 GWB declares car-
tels void, but under certain circumstances a cartel may be
validated. Sometimes, an approval by the Federal Cartel
Authority is required. In extraordinary circumstances, a
cartel may be authorized by the Secretary of the Ministry of
Commerce. This procedure contributes to maintaining predic-
tability and avoiding ligitation. Thus, specialized
decisionmakers, who are familiar with economic theory and
the specific markets, and not courts or juries have to
struggle with economic theory in the first place.
IV. An Example
Recent American case law presents a paradigm of the
differences between the approaches under the present
American antitrust law and the GWB.
After Monsanto364 the Supreme Court had, amidst the
dispute over the appropriate approach towards resale price
maintenance, the chance to clarify its position. But, in-
stead of establishing clear standards, Business
Electronics365 became another example to illustrate the
problems faced by American antitrust law.
The Courts reasoning reveals the impracticable stan-
dards of Colgate.366 Both the majority and the dissenting
opinion reflect insecurity and confusion surrounding es-
tablishing a violation of antitrust law and properly using
economic theory. Additionally, it appears that the justices
of the Supreme Court attribute different meanings to certain
terms. Hence the confusion surrounding interpretation and
use of terminology.
Moreover, this decision presents some deeper concern
with regard to antitrust ligitation and jury trial.
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A. Business Electronics Corporation v. Sharp Electronics
Corporation
After Matsushita,367 were the court found on the basis
economic theory that a predatory pricing scheme was not
reasonable,36B Business Electronics369 indicates that
application of neoclassical economic theory will also become
increasingly important in the area of vertical restraints.
In Business Electronics the Court indicated again its
reluctance to apply per se rules in the area of vertical
restraints and relied on Sylvania's holding "that departure
from the rule of reason standard must be based on demon-
strable economic effect rather than ... upon formalistic
line drawing"370 to narrow the scope of the per se rule.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court reemphasized that interbrand
competition is the main purpose of antitrust law.37l
1. The Decision of the Majority
The Majority found that, according to the standards of
Monsanto,372 a price fixing agreement between Sharp and
Hartwell could not be established. Furthermore, the court
addressed the question whether a per se rule or a rule of
reason is the appropriate standard.
2. The Weighing of the Evidence
The most interesting part of Business Electronics was
the ananlysis the Court used in finding that no price fixing
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conspiracy between Sharp and Hartwell could be proven.
Instead of addressing the evidentiary problems of proofing a
conspiracy as done in Monsanto,373 the Court applied an
economic analysis. However, this analysis did not include
consideration of the facts of the case at hand, such as the
simple question of whether the terminating manufacturer
could give any business reasons other than that he did not
want to risk termination by the customer. Instead of inquir-
ing into the actual case, the Court described the free rider
problem and listed the procompetitive effects of higher
prices according to economic theory. The Court found that,
based on economic theory, anticompetitive effect are not
likely.374 The main issue, however, whether there was an
agreement or a conspiracy between Hartwell and Sharp to
maintain a certain price level was not addressed explicitly.
Instead of considering the facts of the case both the
Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court applied neoclassical
theory and held that "[a] quite plausible purpose of the
vertical restriction here was to enable Hartwell to provide
better services under its sales franchise agreement"375 and
reasoned "[t]here is no merit to petitioner's contention
that an agreement on the remaining dealer's price or price
levels will so often follow from terminating another dealer
because of its price cutting that prophylaxis against resale
price maintenance warrants the District Court's per se
rule. ,,376.
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Interestingly, the Supreme Court addressed the addi-
tional problem of sparking lawsuits of terminated dealers
who might convince a jury that their termination was the
result of cutting rather than service cutting.377 However,
this concern should not obstruct the role of the jury. It is
the task of the jury to evaluate the facts of a case, and a
court should not take decisions away from the jury.37B The
Court admitted that the jury might be exposed to the "highly
plausible claim that its real motivation was to terminate a
price cutter"379 (as a matter of fact) but then continued
that this explanation is not probable. Instead of giving the
case to a jury, the Supreme Court unveiled the "real motiva-
tion" and concluded that "manufacturers are often motivated
by a legitimate desire to have dealers provide services,
combined with the reality that price cutting is frequently
made possible by -free riding' on the services provided by
other dealers"3Bo (as a matter of economic theory).
Thus, the Supreme Court replaced the "common sense"
element (which a jury is supposed to contribute in a trial)
with economic reasoning. In addition to replacing the jury
with economic theory, the Court also disregarded the facts.
The Court did not even investigate the reasons of Business
Electronic's termination. The Court simply assumed -- based
on its belief in the "free rider" argument -- that Sharp
wanted to assure better services. The Court did also not
inquire into whether the termination was caused by
Hartwell's superior bargaining power.3B1 The court ignored
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Sharp's inability to submit evidence that its termination
was based on legitimate nonprice-related reasons, such as
insufficient service of Business Electronics. Furthermore,
the court assumed that a procompetitive effect of eliminat-
ing price competition was "quite plausible". Based on the
foregoing rationale the Court anew replaced facts with
economic theory.
3. The Dissenting Opinion
As the dissent points out in Business Electronics,382
the facts of the case made a price fixing conspiracy most
obvious.
The termination of Business Electronics was initiated
by the ultimatum of Hartwell. The dissent criticizes that,
although Sharp terminated Business Electronics because of
his discounting practices, no inference of an implied price
agreement was drawn. Not even a prima facie assumption of
price fixing conspiracy was drawn.
The basic criticism of the dissent is that the majority
failed to address the real problem presented by the case.
"More importantly, if instead of speculating about ir-
relevant vertical nonprice restraints, we focus on the
precise character of the agreement before us, we can readily
identify its anticompetitive nature."383
Another concern of the dissent is that the majority did
not "attach any weight to the value of intrabrand competi-
tion".384 And the dissent accuses the majority of
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misinterpreting Sylvania3Bs since Sylvania "held that a
demonstrable benefit to interbrand competition will outweigh
the harm to intrabrand competition",3B6 while Sylvania did
not imply "that the elimination of intrabrand competition
could be justified as reasonable without any evidence of a
purpose to improve interbrand competition."3B7 The dissent
points out that in Sylvania the procompetitive effects on
interbrand competition were based on the assumption that a
manufacturer is interested in structuring its distribution
efficiently. However, in Business Electronics3BB the ter-
mination of Business Electronics was initiated by a dealer
"who care[s] less about the general efficiency of a
product's promotion than [its] own profit margins".3B9 The
dissent concludes with the statement that the majority
opinion "is inconsistent with the legislative judgment that
underlies the Sherman Act itself";390 i.e., that the
relevant market "is worthy of legal protection",39~ and that
the."value of competition" includes "all elements of a bar-
gain".392
a) The Suggested Approach of the Dissenting Opinion
As the majority acknowledges, the dissent presents "a
more complex analytic structure"393 The first sentence of
the dissent addresses the crucial shortcoming of the
majority: the assumption that the case "concerns the
legality of a 'vertical nonprice restraint' ."394
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The dissent's argument focuses on the difference bet-
ween "naked" and "ancillary" restraint. The dissent relies
on Judge Taft's holding in United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel CO.395 for its proposition that naked restraints, as
opposed to ancillary restraints, have the sole objective of
restraining competition. The Court in Addyston396 held that
a restraint cannot have a lawful purpose when its "sole ob-
ject is to restrain trade in order to avoid the competition
which it has always been the policy of the common law to
foster."397
The dissent in Business Electronics is misinterpreted
by the majority to the extent that it is not "ancillarity"
which leads to the more favorable rule of reason approach.
One can interpret the dissent's "naked/ancillary" dichotomy
in two ways. The majority understood the "naked" and "ancil-
lary" distinction as meaning "alone" or "in the context of
other covenants," and cited Bork for the proposition that
"vertical arrangements are ancillary to the -transaction of
supplying and purchasing'''.39B
The majority made the mistake of assuming that the
restraint in question was a nonprice restraint, and, accord-
ingly treated the restraint under a distorted rule of reason
scrutiny. However, if one looks closer at the dissent, the
distinction between "naked" and "ancillary" refers to the
purpose of the restraint. The dissent argues that in Busi-
ness Electronics, the mode of analysis should be determined
by the characterization of the restraint. Therefore, a price
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restraint would not escape per se condemnation only because
another nonprice restraint is attached. A closer look at the
restraint would penetrate any disguise and make a proper
treatment of the restraint possible.
Therefore, the dissent asks a question the majority
failed to address: what was the reason for the termination?
The dissent admits that the termination may have been based
on two reasons: l)Sharp could have terminated Business
Electronics for the reasons the majority imputed, i.e., to
terminate a price cutter to prevent free riding; or 2)Sharp
could simply have been coerced by Hartwell's ultimatum.
In the latter case, however, the restraint is exactly
the type of conduct which was condemned by Judge Taft:
avoiding price competition in order to charge higher prices.
A result which, if it would achieved by the means of cartel,
boycott, etc., would be clearly outlawed.
b) The Economic Arguments of the Dissent
The dissent in Business Electronics looks at the facts
of the case in evaluating the conspiracy between Sharp and
Hartwell. The dissent does not rely on a single sided theory
but scrutinizes the fact of the case.
(l)The Dissent's Joint Action Argument
Because, under American antitrust law joint action has
to be established to condemn a conduct, the dissent con-
centrates on the joint action issue. Therefore, the dissent
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in Business Electronics attempts to properly distinguish
between unilateral and joint action.
To establish joint action the dissent points out that,
from an economic point of view, it is important to distin-
guish whether the incentive to employ a restraint came from
the manufacturer, who is interested in establishing a effi-
cient distribution system for his products, or from a dealer
who is more interested in his profit margin than an overall
efficient distribution system.399 The dissent argues that it
is inconsistent of the majority to support its view with
efficiency arguments based on the attempt of a manufacturer
to introduce an efficient distribution system, when the fac-
tual setting of the case indicates otherwise. Hartwell
created incentive for the termination and was is speculative
to assume that Sharp terminated Business Electronics volun-
tarily for the sake of its distribution system. Clearly, if
Sharp wanted to promote efficiency, he could have terminated
Business Electronics earlier. Sharp knew that Business
Electronics was a price cutter. Nevertheless, Sharp con-
tinued to do business with Business Electronics. Obviously
not the efficiency notion but the ultimatum of Hartwell in-
duced Sharp's termination. This important argument is not
recognized by the majority in Business Electronics. The
dissent addresses specifically this point and concentrates
"on the precise character of the agreement,"400 identifying
its anticompetitive nature. The dissent raises the crucial
question of whether elimination of price competition or
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other legitimate business reasons for the termination
existed. The dissenting justices concluded that, "given the
jury's finding and the evidence in this record," protecting
Hartwell from price competition was the sole function of the
agreement in question. The dissent agued that the agreement,
therefore, "fits squarely within the category of 'naked
restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of com-
petition'."40:l.
Interestingly, the dissent concentrated more qualifying
the restraint as "naked" rather than addressing the "joint
action issue". The dissent had its problems with the stan-
dards of the Colgate doctrine,402 which requires, besides
proof that a manufacturer terminates a dealer for his
pricing behavior, proof of a conspiracy. The dissent pursued
the notion that, most probably, a "naked" price restr.aint
which cannot be justified by the imposing manufacturer con-
stitutes a price fixing arrangement. However, the same ef-
fect could have been reached if Sharp had pursued its own
high price policy in systematically terminating price cut-
ters. Therefore, difficult problems in prooving the "real
motivation" exist.
(2) The Dissent's Boycott Argument
Upon further ananlysis, is becomes apparent that the
dissent in Business Electronics made the same mistake as the
majority in confusing economic effects and established stan-
dards. The dissent correctly reasoned that, if there had
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been more than one competing dealer, the effect of Business
Electronic's termination might be the same as if there had
been a conspiracy between these dealers which would have
constituted an illegal boycott:403
Indeed, since the economic consequences of
Hartwell's ultimatum to respondent [Sharp] are
identical to those that would result from a com-
parable ultimatum by two of three dealers in a
market - and since a two-party price fixing agree-
ment is just as unlawful as a three-party price
fixing agreement - it is appropriate to employ the
term 'boycott' to characterize this agreement.
However, this reasoning confuses effects and established
standards. Under American antitrust law, a boycott requires
a conspiracy on one level of distribution. Although the
effects may be the same a two level 'boycott' does not con-
stitute a boycott under American antitrust law. Otherwise,
if one merely concentrates on the effect, the reverse argu-
ment can be made to abandon other rules, such as allowing
conspiracy among dealers, because the effect is arguably the
same as if the manufacturer had imposed vertical
restraints.404 The 'boycott' argument of the Business
Electronics dissent could be rebutted according to the same
rationale the dissent used to support the 'boycott' argu-
ment. The effect of Business Electronics termination could
be as easily be the result of a clearly illegal boycott as
the result of clearly legal unilateral conduct. The dissent
itself recognizes that "[a]ny attempt to define the boun-
daries of per se illegality by the number of parties to
85
different agreements with the same anticompetitive conse-
quences can only breed uncertainty in the law and confusion
for the businessman''.405 Therefore, an effect orientated
confuses confuse established standards.406 The rule of law
would suffer.
(3) The Dissent's "Horizontal" Classification
Another argument of the dissent in Business Electronics
indicates the problems which arise when it is considered
necessary to establish formalistic requirements. These
problems are highlighted by the dissent's argument that the
restraint in question should have been classified as
horizontal. The dissent relied on Cernuto Inc. v. united
Cabinet CO.407 where the Third Circuit focused on the ex-
clusionary effect on the dealer level and concluded that,
because the effect was on the interdealer level, the fact
that a manufacturer terminated its dealer constituted a
horizontal restraint. Although this argument is not without
logical merit it must be rejected for legal reason. Aban-
doning the horizontal/vertical dichotomy would abrogate one
of the last predictable rules left in the area of vertical
restraints in American antitrust law. Since almost every
vertical restraint has its horizontal implications, another
vague and discretionary concept would, according to the
dissent's rationale, replace predictable standards.
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4. Comment
The dissent employs a more sophisticated approach by
considering the facts of the case instead of replacing facts
through theory as done by the majority. Although the dissent
gives strong and convincing arguments toward establishing a
price fixing conspiracy the dissent is bound by the limita-
tions of antitrust law. At present, American antitrust law,
does not proscribe means of adequately dealing with the
described conduct. Unfortunately, instead of pointing out
this problem, the dissent committed in Business Electronics
the same mistake as the majority. The dissent focused on the
effects of the conduct, attempting to squeeze the conduct
into a per se category. Arguments founded on the effect of
conduct, can support virtually any view.
Business Electronics illustrates the problem faced by
American antitrust law faces: current legal reasoning is
stuck with single sided economic theory and artificial bor-
derlines between per se illegal conduct and conduct which is
subject to rule of reason scrutiny.
A way to solve the dilemma would be to concentrate on
quality rather than on the effect of a conduct. The dissent-
ing opinion in Business Electronics suggested an approach
concentrating on the quality of conduct. Furthermore, the
Business Electronics dissent asked the question central to
goals of the antitrust: whether a conduct has redeeming vir-
tues or whether the sole purpose of the conduct is the sup-
pression of competition.4oa
I
I
I
I
I
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However, under existing antitrust law -- particularly
the evidentiary requirements to establishing conspiracy and
the Colgate doctrine's409 generosity in allowing clearly an-
ticompetitive strategies as long as they remain unilateral -
_ much clearly anticompetitive conduct may escape condemna-
tion.
B. Business Electronics and the View of the GWB
In analyzing Business Electronics under the GWB, the
differences between the conceptions of the GWB and American
antitrust law become clear. Business Electronics could have
been challenged under several provisions of the GWB.
1. § 15 GWB
Sharp and Hartwell could have concluded an explicit or
tacit agreement to restrict Hartwell's freedom to determine
prices in violation of § 15 GWB. Although it is logical to
conclude that Hartwell will adhere more closely to Sharp's
pricing scheme than Business Electronics, the case does not
provide enough facts to assume that an agreement was reached
with regard to Hartwell's pricing behavior. Under § 15 GWB,
German courts would face the same difficulties as the
Supreme Court in attempting to classify the conduct as a
price fixing conspiracy.
However, another "safeguard" provision might vitiate
the conduct of Sharp and Hartwell, since the GWB is not
restricted by the "joint action requirement" and, therefore,
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incorporates a different understanding of the term "boycott"
than American antitrust law.
2. § 25(2) GWB
To avoid the abovementioned difficulties, the GWB
employs specific safeguards with regard to behavior the GWB
is intended to condemn. Therefore, other typical strategies,
which are not in the scope of § 15 GWB but are nevertheless
suited to influence pricing decisions, are addressed in
§ 25(2) GWB.4J..oSharp would have violated § 25(2) GWB if it
had conditioned the termination upon Business Electronic's
pricing behavior or tried to threaten Business Electronics.
However, the facts did not indicate that Sharp contacted
Business Electronic's before termination. Therefore, §
25(2) GWB leaves a loophole for firms which that terminate
price cutters "without comment". However, although this
proceeding is not probable,4J..J..this conduct can be chal-
lenged as soon as an effort to establish a certain price
level is revealed.
3. § 26(1) GWB
§ 26(1) GWB addresses the typical situation given in
Business Electronics. Under § 26(1) GWB enterprises may not,
with the intent of unfairly harming another enterprise, in-
cite another enterprise to refuse to sell. Inciting other
enterprise is presumably unfair. Therefore, Hartwell would
have to justify his threat to terminate his contract with
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Sharp. Because the GWB does not accept Business Electronic's
price cutting as a defense, Hartwell would have to show
other justifications for his ultimatum. According to the
high value of price competition under the GWB, a justifica-
tion will be only accepted in extreme situations.412
Hartwell would have to show that he was in a kind of "self
defense" situation.413 The attempt to achieve a "naked
restraint", however, would never escape condemnation.
Accordingly, under the GWB -- if a judge would have
reached the same conclusion as the district court's jury did
-- there is no question that the termination of Business
Electronics would have been outlawed under 26 I GWB.
c. The Advantage of the GWB Approach
Particularly in cases like Business Electronics the GWB
is less lenient in allowing anticompetitive conduct to es-
cape condemnation. The GWB is not restricted by the notions
of "naked" and "ancillary" or by the "horizontal/vertical
dichotomy." Also, the GWB does not distinguish between
"unilateral" and "joint action". Arguably, the GWB approach
is more pragmatic than the American approach since the GWB
addresses anticompetitive conduct without limiting the pos-
sibilities of challenging this conduct through imposing ar-
tificial distinctions. As soon an the attempt is made to
impose price restrictions, harmful conduct (as identified by
the lawmaker) triggers the application of the GWB. Moreover,
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so-called ersatz strategies are recognized and condemned by
the GWB.
As the success of the GWB in this area of the law
shows, the GWB has arguably chosen an approach which is
faily well suited to coping with the realities of the market
place. The effectiveness of the GWB in dealing with market
realities sharply contrasts the insufficiencies of American
antitrust law.
D. Conclusion Chapter Three and Four
The GWB's rigid approach towards resale price main-
tenance should be preferred to current American principles
for several reasons: The freedom to set prices is one of the
last freedoms left to the buyer of a product or a
franchisee. Especially in franchise agreements vertical
restraints are extremely limiting to the freedom of the con-
tracting parties. Allowing resale price maintenance would
constitute a further step toward abolishing intrabrand com-
petition. If freedom to set prices is diminished, almost no
commercial freedom is left to the sole proprietor. Quality
and service competition are inferior to price competi-
tion.4~4
Moreover, the freedom of the single businessman to strive
for business by using one of his most convincing arguments,
a competitive price, would be endangered. This denial of
competitive means of lone operators would eschew competitive
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tension and viable markets. Furthermore, an ambiguous ef-
ficiency argument used by rule of reason scrutiny would
create uncertainty. This uncertainty is not outweighed by
the probability of deterring procompetitive resale price
maintenance.
As shown in Monsanto415 and Business Electronics416 the
Colgate doctrine417 is mainly responsible for the confusion
in the area of vertical restraints. Several factors support
abolishing the Colgate doctrine. There are two primary con-
cerns that urge a reversal of Colgate. First, enterprises
use pressure to coerce other enterprises to adhere to a cer-
tain pricing scheme, indicating that these enterprises pos-
ses market power. Second, the existence of market dominating
firms indicates market imperfections.
To cope with these imperfections and to protect smaller
enterprises from their negative effects, the GWB favors
maintaining a viable market structure as a means of ensuring
"freedom of competition;" the grim alternative is to allow
market dominating firms to take of their superior bargaining
position.
V. Vertical Nonprice Restraints
Both German and American antitrust law recognize that
vertical nonprice restraints may pursue legitimate business
purposes4~a and therefore treat them more favorably than
horizontal restraints. Similarly strategic market conduct
affecting vertical relationships is generally allowed. Hori-
zontal restraints are considered to be more harmful to com-
petition because they directly limit the competition between
competing firms (interbrand competition) on either the
manufacturer or dealer level. Horizontal restraints are
suspect because they presumably have no other purpose than
to suppress competition.
Vertical restraints, however, primarily limit competi-
tion within a distribution chain (intrabrand competition)
and only indirectly effect interbrand competition.4~9 It is
acknowledged that vertical restraints often reflect the
interest of a manufacturer in designing his distribution
system and to effectively marketing his products.42o It is
recognized that the manufacturer, who is generally free not
to sell his products at all, has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that his products are sold in accordance with his
marketing scheme, that the good will of his products is
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protected, that his products' reputation is enhanced, that
the purchaser of his products get sufficient pre- and after
sale services, etc.42~ Another argument in favor of vertical
restraints is the principle that the freedom to enter con-
tracts and to agree on contractual terms is a democratic
value. However, this freedom reaches its limits when other,
prevailing values, such as the goals incorporated in an-
titrust law are endangered.422
Another notion with regard to vertical restraints,
which is emphasized under the American antitrust law is the
argument that restriction of intrabrand competition is not
that harmful to consumers as long as the manufacturers ex-
pose their products to interbrand competition.423
It is not the purpose of this thesis to give an in-
depth evaluation of all the different vertical restraint,
but rather to analyse the underlying policy and the role of
economic theory of both the German and the American an-
titrust law. Therefore in this chapter, only the most impor-
tant restraints and some instructive cases will be analyzed
to illustrate the approach the respective law takes.
A. Vertical Nonprice Restraints under American Antitrust Law
The American antitrust law in the area of nonprice ver-
tical restraints, such as territorial and consumer restric-
tions, exclusive dealing, and tying arrangements had ex-
perienced drastic changes in its treatment by the courts.424
I,
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since the 1977 landmark case, Sylvania,425 which
revolutionized the antitrust landscape most vertical
restraints426 are subject to rule of reason scrutiny.
Another important factor which is heavily influencing
the approach towards vertical relationships is the Colgate
doctrine.427 The Colgate doctrine generally allows self-im-
posed restrictions by a seller42B and preempts other
unilateral conduct from condemnation under the antitrust
law.
Under American antitrust law, several provisions may
apply to vertical nonprice restrictions and other strategic
business conduct which is aimed at hindering competition.
Most of the "typical" vertical restraints are covered
by Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act429 and Sec. 3 of the Clayton
Act.430 Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act's broad language generally
prohibits "every contract, ... or conspiracy in restraint of
trade.",43~ Sec. 3 of the Clayton Act addresses more
specifically exclusive dealing and tying arrangements by
providing that432
[i]t shall be unlawful to lease or make a sale
... on the condition that the lessee or pur-'
chaser thereof shall not use or deal in goods ...
of a competitor ... of the seller, where the ef-
fect of such lease, sale ... may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce.
Though Sec. 3 of the Clayton Act covers only restraints
which involve commodities, other restraints of the kind
described in Sec. 3 of the Clayton Act but involving
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services or licenses are governed by Sec. 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. However, despite of the different statutory
language the treatment of vertical restraints is basically
the same under both provisions.433
1. Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
The leading case for exclusive dealing434 is Standard
Oil of California, Inc. v. United States435 (Standard Sta-
tions) where the Court held that Sec. 3 of the Clayton Act
is violated "whenever competition has been foreclosed in a
substantial share of the market".436 The "substantial share
of the market" was determined through a "quantitative sub-
stantiality rule", the impact on competition was measured by
Standard Station's market share. Efficiency effects and ac-
tual foreclosure impact were not considered.437 Because the
"quantitative substantiality rule" outlawed many reasonable
exclusive dealing arrangements, the Supreme Court mitigated
the impact of Standard Stations438 and applied a less rigid
analysis in Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal CO.439 to
determine the foreclosure impact of a 20 year requirement
contract for coal. In employing a "qualitative substan-
tiality analysis" the courts were able to treat exclusive
dealing arrangements more favorably under a rule of reason
approach. 440
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2. Analysis of Vertical Restraints under the Rule of Reason
Under the rule or reason approach the courts focused on
analysing vertical restraints on the inter-jintrabrand
dichotomy and asked whether it is likely that a restraint
has a "permanent effect" on interbrand competition and
whether the "redeeming virtues" of the restraint outweigh
the negative impact on intrabrand competition. Although the
rationale of Sylvania441 required consideration of both cri-
terias the second criteria tends to be increasingly ignored
by the courts.442 As shown in Business Electronics,443
courts which rely on the premises of the Chicago School
theory are willing to impute the "redeeming virtue" by as-
suming that a "rational businessman" employs a restraint to
create efficiency. On the other hand the threat of a "per-
manent effect" .on interbrand competition is not taken
seriously because the flat statement "[c]artels are neither
easy to form nor easy to maintain"444 replaces thorough
scr~tiny. Also the fact that markets are operating imper-
fectly and therefore anticompetitive effects may occur in
concentrated or otherwise imperfect markets long before the
catelization question arises is not addressed by the courts
which are relying on the assumptions of the economic model
of the Chicago School.445
Because the rule of reason approach enables the courts
to "adopt any standard of reasonableness they see fit and
quote any prior opinions for any purpose", 446 several at-
tempts have been made to give the courts "guidelines" for
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their rule of reason analysis and to reduce the courts dis-
cretion.447 However, when the suggested "guidelines" reflect
the view of the Chicago School, they rely on neoclassical
economic theory and assert that efficiency arguments and
effects on price and output are appropriate measuring
sticks44B rather than considering market effects.
The dispute about the proper application of the rule of
reason is not decided yet and will be subject to further
discussion among American scholars and courts. The arguments
which are raised by the contrasting views are rooted in the
different perception of the goals of antitrust.449
Unlike the American antitrust law the GWB does not con-
tain a rule or reason and, although, the evaluation of a
vertical restraint requires a comprehensive analysis of the
economic effect of the restraint in question, the analysis
is much more directed (best described as: "normatively
directed analysis")450 and more limited in its scope than
its American counterpart.45~
3. Tying Arrangements
Tying arrangements452 experienced a special treatment
under American antitrust law. After the initial rule of
reason approach,453 the Supreme Court moved towards a per se
type standard454 and in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United
States455 expressly established a per se standard. The Court
condemned tie-ins because of their leverage effect which
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foreclosed competitors from the market and restrained free
competition in the market of the tied product.
However, the rigorous per se rule barred economic ad-
vantages of packaging the sales of products.456 Particularly
in the area of franchise agreements the harsh per se rule
did not comply with business needs. Therefore, the impact of
the per se rule was mitigated by manipulating the inter-
pretation of the separate product requirement. Instead of
analyzing the agreement under a rule of reason standard the
court addressed the question whether a multitude of products
packaged in a franchise agreement may be considered as one
product.457 If the "single product defense" is raised, the
court has to investigate in circumstances and business jus-
tifications of the tie. Various standards have been
developed by the courts and the agreement is actually
analyzed by rule of reason to avoid the application of the
per se rule against tying.45B Furthermore a tying arrange-
ment may be defended with "good will" and "quality" defenses
if if no other reasonable way to protect good will and
quality is given.459 Also, a "new or infant business
defense" is accepted by the courts.460
a) Move Towards a Rule of Reason
The increasing impact of economic analysis on the ap-
plication of per se rules against tying is reflected in the
recent decision Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde461 where a hospital packaged acute-care treatment and
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anesthesiology services. The hospital alleged cost efficien-
cies and improved services and the court upheld the arrange-
ment. The reasons given for this treatment of the "tie-in"
illustrate the need to clarify the standards. The majority
of the judges upheld the per se rule and concluded that
there were two products but then denied that the hospital -
although attracting 30% of the district's patients - had
enough market power to trigger the application of the per se
rule. The remaining judges favored a rule or reason approach
and reasoned that only one product was involved.
Thus, it is to conclude that the treatment of tying
arrangements is subject to vague and difficult standards.
The per se rule against tying is mitigated by that many ex-
emptions and artificial interpretation so that a tying
analysis resembles more an rule of reason approach than ap-
plication of a per se standard.
b) Comparison with the GWB's Treatment of Tie-Ins
Interestingly, the GWB's approach towards tying con-
siders most of the arguments raised under American antitrust
law. First, as general rule, GWB allows tying as long as the
tie involves products which are related "by their nature or
the custom of trade".462 Second, even tie-ins of non related
products are not generally prohibited.463 Third, limiting
this rule, a tie of non-related products of a "powerful"
enterprise is considered prima facie abusive and the firm
has to provide a business justification for the tie. The
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necessity for the tie has to be more convincing if the tie
might adversely affects the market. Hence the conduct of
"powerful" enterprises generally has a strong impact on
markets the requirements to justify a restraint are heavy.
Therefore, a tie of a powerful firm will only escape condem-
nation if there is no other reasonable and less restrictive
way to protect the businessmen's good will.464
4. Other Vertical Nonprice Restraints
Like exclusive dealing arrangements other vertical
restraints are subject to rule of reason scrutiny. However,
as mentioned before the rule of reason requires a broad
ranging inquiry into all circumstances of the market and
allows, especially when no "guideline" for this inquiry is
provided, justification of almost every restraint. Under
American antitrust law abound defenses are recognized, such
as newcomer defense, failing company defense, orderly
marketing defense, attracting new distributors defense, and
the free rider defense. However, these defenses are also
recognized under the GWB. More important in the evaluation
of vertical restraint is that American antitrust law does
not consider the protection of intrabrand competition is not
regarded as the main purpose of antitrust law.465 But, most
important is the fact that the evidentiary burden which the
plaintiff has to bear is very heavy. If a plaintiff wants to
prove an unreasonable effect he might have to overcome the
economic assumptions of the court. As shown in Business
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Electronics4GG the court might be preoccupied with the no-
tion that a conduct is reasonable rather than questionable.
Another economic question raised in evaluating vertical
restraints is the consideration of entry barriers. If the
court does not realize the problem of entry barriers the
court will conclude that the "qualitative impact" on the
market does not exist hence new market entrants are readily
available to enter the market and punish anticompetitive
conduct.4G7
B. Vertical Nonprice Restraints under the GWB
With the exception of resale price maintenance other
"vertical"4GB restraints are basically permitted under the
GWB.4G9 Only if "powerful" firms are involved is the GWB
less lenient. The lawmaker recognized in drafting the GWB
that the question whether other restraints have pro- or an-
ticompetitive effects cannot be answered in advance by the
legislative authority.470 However, to avoid too much discre-
tion the GWB does not have a broad general rule (such as the
rule of reason) which has to be interpreted by the courts.
The GWB defines certain types of conduct which might unduly
restrict competition and indicates more or less specific
points which should be analyzed. Moreover, the GWB employs
legal presumptions to ease the burden of proof471 and ap-
plies to certain kind of conduct of powerful firms standards
which resemble a modified per se rule under the American
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antitrust laws, i.e. presumptive illegality which has to be
rebutted with an accepted defense.472 However, as will be
shown later, the GWB has its problems with the attempt to
describe the prerequisites of its applicability as accurate-
ly as possible without loosing too much of its practica-
bility and without leaving too much anticompetitive conduct
unchallenged.
To solve this problem the lawmaker of the GWB chose to
establish two "levels" of control according to the "market
power"473 of the firm which is using the restraint.
All vertical restraints are subject to abuse control by
the Federal Cartel Authority under § 18 GWB. The size of the
firms employing the restraint is not considered. However,
due to complicated statutory language and heavy evidentiary
requirements, the abuse control under § 18 GWB is a weak
weapon to challenge the increasing coverage of the market
with restrictive agreements.474
The unsatisfying statutory setting of § 18 GWB,
however, is no reason for major concern because basically
the same conduct which may be subject to abuse control under
§ 18 GWB can be challenged under §§ 22, 26 and 37a GWB.
These provisions are more rigid with vertical restraints,
partly because of their assumption that certain conduct is
presumptively illegal. The only shortcoming of these
provisions in comparison to § 18 GWB is the fact that they
apply only to "qualifying enterprises", i.e. enterprises
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which are market dominating or which are able to create a
dependency relationship.475
In particular, since in the GWB's amendments of 1973
and 1980 where the scope of § 26 GWB was broadened, § 26 GWB
became a efficient tool to outlaw business conduct of
"powerful" firms. The GWB is particularly concerned with
strategic market conduct of "powerful" firms. According to
the GWB's perception, these firms are because of their
superior position in the market able to impair competition.
Therefore, the Federal Cartel Authority focuses on §§ 22
and 26 GWB476 rather than on § 18 GWB. For example the most
wellknown tying case477 was challenged as a violation of §
22(4) GWB and one of the most controversial exclusive deal-
ing cases478 was challenged as violation of § 26(2) GWB.
Both cases were dealing with subject matter "typical" for §
18 GWB.
However, although § 18 GWB itself was never in the
focus of enforcement activities, a closer look at the inten-
tion of § 18 GWB is of interest because the values protected
under § 18 GWB are the same values which have to be taken
into consideration when a vertical restraint is challenged
under a another provision of the GWB. Moreover these values
are recognized as leading principles which have to be con-
sidered if other ambiguous terms in other areas of the law
have to be filled out.479
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1. § 18 GWB
§ 18 GWB is covers all restrictions which effect the
freedom to choose one's contracting partner.480 The use of a
restraint may be prohibited if it unduly restricts competi-
tion. § 18 GWB covers both direct and indirect, legal and
factual restraints and does not explicitly distinguish bet-
ween intrabrand and interbrand competition.
The development of § 18 GWB unveils significant changes
with regard to the values protected under the GWB and the
approach towards vertical restraints. In the GWB of 1957, §
18 GWB was designed to protect the competitive freedom of
the "individuals as part of the competition" and the "com-
petition as institution".481 The Federal Cartel Authority
had to prove that both the freedom of the "individuals as
part of the competition" and the freedom of competition were
unduly restricted. This burden of proof was hard to meet and
only one relevant case was decided under the 1957 version of
§ 18 GWB.482 The criticism with regard to this evidentiary
burden of § 18 GWB led to the 1965 amendment. Since 1965 it
has been possible to challenge a restraint when either the
"individuals as a group" or the "competition as institution"
is unduly restricted by the restraint.
However, § 18 GWB was still deemed to be insufficient
to adaequately protect the market and in 1973 the protection
of the "individual in its individual freedom" was added to
the values protected under § 18 GWB. The following reason
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was given to support the explicit inclusion of the
individual's freedom within the scope of § 18 GWB:483
The restricted partners have at least to be
protected by § 18 GWB when their freedom to compete
is restricted and when at the same time numerous
enterprises are similarly bound. In this case the
competition on the market is endangered.
The lawmaker of the GWB recognized that the freedom of com-
petition and competitors cannot be viewed separately and
that protection of both contributes to the maintenance of
competition.
a) Scope of § 18 GWB
To evaluate whether a restraint is abusive under § 18
GWB, a two step inquiry is applied. First, the restraint
must fall into the scope of restraints covered by § 18 GWB.
Four types of restraints are enumerated in § 18 GWB:
1) Restrictions on the freedom to use the supplied goods,
other goods or commercial services.
2) Restrictions as to the purchase of other goods or com-
mercial services from, or their sale to third parties.
3) Restrictions as to the sale of the supplied goods to
third parties.
4) Tying arrangements.
The courts interpreted this first test very broadly.
Therefore, hardly any restraint imposed in a contract will
not qualify for further scrutiny. Not only "typical"
restraints such as territorial and customer restraints,
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tying and all kinds of exclusive dealing arrangements, but
also other restraints, such as location clauses484 and
profit passover arrangements485 are within the scope of § 18
GWB.
Though § 18 GWB embraces also economic restraints, such
as monetary advantages or disadvantages. A qualifying
restriction, for example, might be caused by a rebate based
on the quantity purchased throughout a year. The prospective
rebate constitutes an economic incentive not to buy from
other suppliers.
However, the fact that a restraint falls within the
scope of § 18 GWB does not say anything about its antitrust
implication. The broad scope used in defining the types of
restraints covered by § 18 GWB is intended only to provide
as much control over restraints as possible. If a restraint
is within the scope of § 18 GWB, the Federal Cartel
Authority is authorized to scrutinize the restraint further
under the second step of § 18 GWB analysis. The second step
focuses on the impact the restraint has on competition and
competitors.
Under this second step a restraint may be considered
abusive if either one of three values protected under § 18
GWB is endangered. The thresholds enacted by § 18 GWB indi-
cate that§ 18 GWB is primarily concerned with foreclosure
effects and the danger that a market structure might get
cemented through the widespread use of restraints.
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b) § 18(1)(a)
A restraint may be declared void if due to the
restraint a "significant number of enterprises in relation
to competition in the market are similarly bound and unfair-
ly restricted in their freedom of competition".4B6
This requirement is aimed at protecting the enterprises on
the market as a collective. The collective protection ap-
plies to all enterprises which are bound by similar
restraints. The restraint must not be imposed by a single
firm. Hence it is sufficient if a certain restraint is wide-
ly used.4B7 § 18(1)(a) GWB recognizes' that a certain
restraint must be applied to a significant number of
enterprises. Otherwise, competition is not unfairly
restricted because in the latter case the market offers
enough alternatives to the competing market participants.
The size of the firm employing the restraint is not of sig-
nificance. The widespread use is the factor triggering the
application of § 18 GWB.4BB
It is noteworthy that § 18 GWB does not threaten small
firms which are innocently using a restraint. The Federal
Cartel Authority would prohibit the restraint at no cost for
the firm and no individual lawsuits could be filed. There-
fore, as a side effect, the limitation of the enforcement
authority to the Federal Cartel Authority protects smaller
firms which are often not able to evaluate whether 'the com-
plicated threshold requirements of § 18 GWB are met.
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c) § 18(1)(b) GWB
The second alternative which might lead to action under
§ 18 GWB has the objective of protecting third parties if
"by such agreements market entry ... is unfairly restric-
ted".4B9 The GWB does not require concentrated markets to
conclude that there might be an unfair restriction of market
entry.490 Primary concern is that the widespread use of a
restraint cements existing market structures and therefore
may have considerable foreclosure effects.
d) § 18(1)(c) GWB
The third alternative of § 18 GWB is directly aimed at
protecting the freedom of the markets and applies if "by the
extent of such restrictions competition in the market for
these or other goods or commercial services is substantially
impaired".491
In most of the cases in which § 18(1)(c) GWB may apply,
at least one or both of the former test are also met. There
is no clear demarcation line between the three alternatives.
The Federal Cartel Authority may base its order on either
one, two or on all three effects. According to § 18 GWB the
freedom of competition needs, as a prerequisite, both the
freedom of the market participants [§ 18(1)(a)] and free
market entry [§ 18(1)(b) GWB].
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2. Criticism of § 18 GWB
As mentioned before, § 18 GWB is rarely used to
challenge vertical restraints. Since 1958 only a few injunc-
tions492 have been issued under § 18 GWB. Although this
reluctance of the cartel authority reaches "the result which
even agrees with the contemporary perception of competition
theory"[in the United States],493 as a scholar alleges,494
the underlying policies and reasons are quite different.
a) Heavy Burden of Proof
§ 18 GWB will only apply when both a quantitative and
qualitative threshold are met. The quantitative requirement
is minimal. Hence, all restraints which are perceivable may
be subject to abuse control.495 But again the absence of de
minimis rules intends merely to authorize the Federal Cartel
Authority to scrutinize a restraint under § 18 GWB and does
not say abything about the antitrust implication of the
restraint. On the other hand, neither does § 18 GWB provide
quantitative standards defining "substantial". The
"flexibility advantage" that no quantitative threshold was
established to consider a restraint to be "prima facie" un-
fairly restricting competition brings with it the disad-
vantage that every restraint has to be completely
analyzed. 496
A comprehensive analysis requires consideration of
market structure and evaluation of the (future) impact of
the restraint in a specific product market. Accordingly, the
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Federal Cartel Authority bears a heavy burden of proof, and
the accused firms have a wide range of possibilities to
challenge the accuracy of the Federal Cartel's Office
analysis. Furthermore, the analysis under § 18 GWB requires
that not only the conflicting interest of merely two con-
tracting parties have to be taken into consideration but
that the conflicting interests of groups of buyers and
sellers have to be balanced. Because the interests on both
the buyer and seller levels are conflicting it is difficult
to define when a widespread distribution method tends to
unfairly hinder competition.497
Because of these difficulties of proving that a
restraint has an unduly competition-restricting effect, the
Federal Cartel Authority avoided challenging restraints
under § 18 GWB whenever it was possible to attack the
restraint under another provision of the GWB.
In only one case will the use of a vertical restraint
be considered to be abusive without further analysis. The
judgment of § 15 GWB (prohibition of resale price main-
tenance)49B is guiding the analysis under § 18 GWB. There-
fore, exclusive dealing/selective distribution systems which
are primarily aimed at establishing a certain price level
will be considered abusive because it would contradict the
legislative intent of maintaining price competition. In par-
ticular, the design of selective distribution systems which
exclude certain types of "discounters" simply because of
111
their pricing behavior (in the absence of other justifica-
tions) would constitute a violation of § 18 GWB.499
b) Difficult Balancing of Conflicting Interests
Another obstacle to enforcement of § 18 GWB was the
tendency of the courts to overemphasize the individual
freedom to employ a vertical restraint rather than to focus
on the anticompetitive effects on the competition as in-
stitution.50o The courts accepted almost every justification
for the restraint, such as adequateness, good will protec-
tion, or fair risk distribution501 and gave these justifica-
tion more weight than market structure concerns.
This approach is reason for criticism. It is argued
that "competition as institution" and "competitive freedom
of the individual" are not contrary. It is pointed out that
"competition as institution" can only be protected if the
markets are kept open and the freedom of all market par-
ticipants is protected.502
It is pointed out that for example in the most impor-
tant case of exclusive dealing arrangements and tying ar-
rangements (which have the similar effects), the threat to
"competition as institution" is the foreclosure of the
market. Accordingly abuse control has to concentrate on the
goal of keeping the markets open. But this goal can only be
achieved if the third parties are able to use their competi-
tive freedom. Hence, the third parties are not able to use
their competitive freedom when they are foreclosed from
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competition. The remedy in this case is to ensure the
freedom of the individuals by enabling them to enter the
market without being unduly hindered by foreclosed markets.
3. Consequences for § 18 GWB as Enforcement Tool
Because of these problems § 18 GWB failed to provide an
effective basis for challenging restraints which were
employed by smaller firms and which did not qualify for §§
22, 26 GWB. It follows that not the use of economic theory
but the unsatisfactory statutory setting of § 18 GWB led to
the increase of exclusive dealing arrangements which are now
widespread in the car, gasoline and beer distribution.
This "failure" of § 18 GWB is fortunately not crucial.
Most of the restraints which have anticompetitive potential
because they may constitute the attempt to transfer market
power and impair competition are imposed by "powerful"
enterprises because otherwise the buyers would oppose these
restraints.503 For example, exclusive dealing arrangements
which impose an undue burden on the buyer or tying arrange-
ments which are designed to exploit the position of one
product indicate market imperfections would not be accepted
as long as no market imperfections exist. But as soon as a
"powerful" enterprise are involved, the GWB provides "better
tools" to challenge their market conduct.
The "better tools" are §§ 22 and 26 GWB which are aimed
at challenging anticompetitive conduct of "powerful" firms.
The enforcement of the latter provisions is easier because
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they provide some presumptions which must be rebutted. §§ 22
and 26 GWB require that only the interests of two parties
must be weighed against each other rather than considering
interests of a whole market.
But not only the law itself provides a better
guideline. Because of increased enforcement activities, the
courts developed case law which additionally provides more
reliable guidelines for the enforcement. For example courts
assume that certain conduct of powerful firms is a prima
facie violation of either § 22(4) GWB or § 26(2) GWB (or
both). As the comparison with § 18 GWB shows particularly,
the allocation of the burden of proof is the deciding factor
which contributes to the effectiveness of §§ 22(4) and 26(2)
GWB.
4. Other Safeguards for Competition Available under the GWB
As indicated before the "failure" of § 18 GWB does not
lead to per se legality of all vertical restraints though
the GWB restricts the competitive freedom of certain
"powerful"504 enterprises for the sake of the overall
freedom of competition. Vertical restraints and strategic
market conduct employed by these enterprises may be
challenged more easily than under § 18 GWB. These limita-
tions of the competitive freedom of these enterprises are
the price these enterprises have to pay for becoming "market
dominating". A divestiture is not possible under the GWB.
Although the American antitrust law goes so far as to
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provide divestiture measures505 it does not provide special
means to cope with unilateral strategic market conduct of
market dominating firms as long as these firms do not at-
tempt to monopolize. In contrast to the Colgate doctrine506
the GWB addresses also unilateral strategic market conduct,
such as refusal to sell and exploitation. 50? The underlying
concern of the GWB is that powerful firms are able to dis-
tort the competitive process50B which may result in adverse
effects on market structure and - at least in the long run -
may result in poor performance, toO.509
5. §§ 20, 21 GWB
§§ 20, 21 GWB provide special rules for licensing
agreements. Licensing agreements, i.e. agreements dealing
with patents, certain designs, plant and seed varieties, and
know how, may only contain restraints which are not exceed-
ing the scope of the protected right. The intent of § 20 GWB
is to prevent that the owner of a protected right uses this
right as device to abuse his exclusive position.5~o But the
most often used restrictions with regard to type, extent,
quantity, territory, and period of a protected right are
according to the legal presumption of § 20(1) GWB not ex-
ceeding the scope a the protected right and therefore legal.
Furthermore, § 20(2) GWB exempts also technically necessary
restraints, resale price maintenance, grant back clauses,
covenants not to challenge the protected right, and division
of markets outside Germany from application of § 20 GWB.
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However, in the latter case the stricter regulation of Art.
85(1) of the EEC Treaty may apply.511
The detailed regulation of § 20 GWB applies an infr-
ingement test (similar to the American "scope of patent"
doctrine). The economic decision to allow fargoing freedom
in the area of certain licensing agreements was made by the
legislature, the courts do not have to refer to economic
theory. The decision of the lawmaker is based on patent
philosophy. A discussion of this philosophy, however, is
beyond the scope of this studie.512
6. Strategic Conduct of "Powerful" Firms
with regard to strategic market conduct, the GWB has a
different perception of economic theory than the Chicago
School. The Chicago School asserts that unilateral conduct
does not lead to anticompetitive effects because enterprises
cannot impair markets and obtain supra-competitive profits.
According to the Chicago School which plays down the effect
of entry barriers the threat of attracting new enterprises
prevents enterprises from collecting supra-competitive
profits. Furthermore, the Chicago School does not believe
that a "rational" businessmenn would willingly attempt to
impair competition because the businessmen attempts to
achieve efficiencies rather than to distort competition. The
GWB, however, does not believe that competition is self
maintaining and, therefore, recognizes the notion that
businessmen are primilarily interested in raising their
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profits and thus tend to avoid the competitive pressure by
employing strategic market conduct. In particular the GWB
tries to prevent that "powerful" firms from using their
their superior bargaining power and preeminent market posi-
tion to take advantage of market imperfections, to cement
and foster market distortions, and to collect supra-competi-
tive profits.
The GWB is concerned that "efficient" firms will use
their efficiency gain to drive other firms out of the market
rather than to attempt to achieve better performance so the
GWB imputes that firms are willing to trade efficiency for
position.5~3
Because of these differences a comparison of the ap-
proach towards strategic conduct might be of special inter-
est and could reveal points for further discussion.
a) § 22 GWB
The GWB is particularly suspicious with regard to
restraints caused by circumstance. Therefore the Federal
Cartel Authority "may prohibit abusive practices of market
dominating enterprises".5~4 A legal assumption for market
domination is given in § 22 (1) and (2) GWB and a rebuttable
presumption is provided in § 22 (3) GWB. The pivotal and
most difficult point in the application of § 22(4) GWB is
the determination of abuse. The GWB does not define abuse,
but it lists some practices which are considered to be
abusive.5~5 Market dominating enterprises may not impair the
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competitive possibilities of other enterprises. They are not
allowed all of "the competitive possibilities of other
enterprises"5~6 if they cannot submit facts justifying their
behavior.5~7 They are also not allowed to agree on contract
terms which were made possible because of the extraordinary
market position of the contracting firm.5~B They even may be
subject to price control. Furthermore, these firms are not
allowed to discriminate without factual justification.5~9
Unlike the Robinson-Patman Act the GWB does not have a
general discrimination provision. Under § 22(4) GWB only
market dominating firms are considered to be so "dangerous"
that they may not discriminate without justification.520
But, more farreaching than the Robinson-Patman Act, the GWB
condemns all kind of discrimination, not only price dis-
crimination. Since 1973 also dependency creating firms may
not discriminate.52~
Morover, the problem of so called "demand side power",
i.e. big department or chain stores which are able to press
their suppliers to granting them better conditions than the
average buyer was recognized in the late 60's and led to the
amendment of §§ 22(4) and 26(2) GWB. Since 1980 § 22(4) GWB
explicitly enumerates that the use of superior bargaining
power on the demand side is as abusive as strategic market
conduct on the supply side. The GWG reveals the interesting
policy notion that using superior bargaining power on both
buyer and seller level considered to be able to impair
markets and, therefore, suspicious.
118
(1) Defining "Abuse"
The indifinite term "abuse" which the lawmaker choose
to describe the prohibited conduct under § 22(4) GWB is am-
biguous and requires interpretation by the courts. It is the
task of the courts to determine in a case by case applica-
tion whether in a specific situation, given the circumstan-
ces of a certain product market, the restraint in question
is abusive or not. However, this analysis is not as broad as
a rule of reason analysis under American antitrust law, but
rather is a normatively directed balancing procedure.522 The
courts are required to apply a comprehensive analysis which
is guided by the values of the GWB, i.e. to protect and
maintain the freedom of competition and to keep the markets
open.523 In this analysis, the courts have to evaluate the
competitive implications of the restraint and balance them
with the interests of the imposing enterprise.
The way German courts approach a case and the arguments
they use to analyze the competitive impact and validity of a
restraint can be best explained by the leading tying case
Meto Handpreisauszeichner (Meto) which established some
general rules on how to approach vertical restraints and
tying arrangements.
The second case which will be explained more thoroughly is
Effem. Effem deals with a discounting practice and il-
lustrates the GWB's concern about hindrance strategies which
might be employed by market dominating firms.
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(2) Meto-Handpreisauszeichner
In Meto524 a manufacturer of small labeling machines
conditioned its sale of the machines to the purchase of
labels used with the machines.
The court found a market dominating position because Meto
controlled between 89 and 93 percent of the market for small
labeling machines in 1967.525 Moreover the court concluded
that the use of the restrictive practices, such as refusal
to sell to users which did not purchase the labels and the
denial of repair services indicated that Meto was not ex-
posed to significant competition though Meto's conduct
showed that it did not have to behave toward its customers
like an enterprise which is exposed to significant competi-
tion.
The conditioning of the purchase of the labels to the
sale of the labeling machine was held abusive for several
reasons: Both the purchasers on the market for labeling
machines and the manufacturers of labels were unduly
restricted in their freedom to do business. The buyers of
the labeling machines were forced to purchase excessively
priced labels and third enterprises were foreclosed from the
market for labels.
The attempt of Meto to ensure additional earnings and
to strengthen its market position constituted an abuse. A
quality defense and the argument that technical requirements
made the tie-in necessary were heard but rejected by the
court.
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To determine what behavior constitutes "abuse" the
Court referred to the principles of competitive market be-
havior. The Court held that all inherent tendencies of firms
with market power to use this power to endanger effective-
ness of competition, to obstruct the striving for better
performance, and to prevent optimal supply to consumers have
to be suppressed. The Court reasoned that first of all the
market has to be kept open for new entrants.526
(3) Effem-Tierfertignahrung
Another instructive case which reveals the policy of
the GWB is Effem. Besides some clear statements with regard
to the policy goals of the GWB this case furthermore reveals
that all provisions of the GWB are designed to promote the
same goal and that conduct which falls within the scope of
§ 18 GWB also might be attacked as abuse under § 22 GWB and
at the same time constitutes a discrimination under § 26
GWB.
Effem, a German subsidiary of the United States firm
Mars, Inc., granted its customers a yearly rebate. The
rebate was not computed on the basis of the separate orders
but on the purchase of pet food throughout the year.
The court found that Effem had a market dominating position.
The "paramount market position in relation to its cus-
tomers"527 which allowed Effem to set prices and conditions
was established through Effem's 70 percent market share, its
substantial advertising efforts, and its strong brand name
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which was considered to be of special importance due to the
brand loyalty of pet food purchasers.
The abuse of Effem's positions was seen in the effect
of this yearly rebate which lured customers by economic ad-
vantages and thus enhanced Effem's position in the market.
The use of the discount system hindered actual and prospec-
tive competitors and no justification complying with the
goals of the GWB could be offered by Effem, such as cost
justification.
In Effem the court interpreted § 22(4)(2) GWB as a bur-
den on market dominating firms to avoid conduct which is not
rooted in the performance of the contract but is aimed at
restricting the competitive chances of its competitors.
The court reasonred that a rebate which is computed on
long term basis has no relation to the single order, such as
rebate for bigger orders, but is aimed at giving a customer
a reward for constantly ordering from one seller. This
rebate was not justified by cost savings but rather intended
to foreclose other competitors by binding the customer by
the means of this rebate.
In Effem the Court also addressed the question whether
the additional burden of market dominating firms is dis-
criminatory and volative of Art. 3 of the Basic Law. The
Court stated that market dominating firms have special
duties to its customers and competitors which are going
beyond the general rules of conduct in the business. The
Court concluded that the fact that these firms may not
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employ conduct which is allowed other by firms as their con-
stitutionally guaranteed freedom to decide with whom and
under what conditions to deal does not violate Art. 3 of the
Basic Law.528 The law imposed a restriction on market
dominating firms which is justified by the prevailing goal
to maintain an open and competitive market which itself con-
tributes to democracy.
b) § 26(1) GWB
Besides the purpose of opposing ways to circumvent the
prohibition of resale price maintenance, the per se prohibi-
tion of boycotts embraces also boycotts aimed at reaching
results which may be subject to vertical restrictions. §
26(1) GWB shows the value the GWB contributes to the freedom
of enterprises to compete without being unfairly harmed by
third enterprises. Therefore GWB condemns arrangements in-
volving three parties when one party tries "to incite
another enterprise ... to refuse to sell or purchase with
intent to unfairly harm certain enterprises".529 The
economic importance of so-called secondary boycotts is docu-
mented in the OECD Report "Refusal to Sell":530
Cases are becomimg increasingly frequent of tradi-
tional dealers and specialized shops threatening
to discontinue the distribution of the supplier's
product if he delivers to discounters, chainsto-
res, department stores or other non-traditional
retailers. With this policy the traditional
dealers tend to hinder the appearance or develop-
ment of new forms of distribution which are fre-
quently more efficient from the productivity point
of view than the more conservative forms. The
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former opera'te largely on the basis of lower labour
costs and prices achieved through self-service and
other rationalization methods.
In most of the cases the secondary boycott53~ will con-
stitute a violation of § 26(1) GWB. Hence, the mere attempt
to influence the freedom of another firm contradicts the
goals of the GWB to keep market open and prevent market dis-
tortions.532
c) § 26(1) GWB and the Use of Economic Theory
The role of economic theory is small and limited by the
statutory setting of § 26(1) GWB. The policy decision of
§ 26(1) GWB refers to the freedom of the market par-
ticipants. Because a boycott restricts this freedom, a
boycott presumably violates the policy decision codified in
§ 26(1) GWB. The use of economic theory is limited and
focuses only on the question of whether the firm inducing
the restraint has an accepted justification which outweighs
the interference with the competitive process. However, the
kind of defenses which might justify the attempt to induce a
boycott are predetermined by § 26(1) GWB. Since the boycott
affects the freedom of "victim firm" to deal with the in-
duced firm substantially, the firm attempting to induce the
boycott faces a difficult burden in defending their "attack"
on one of the basic goals of the GWB. The inducing will have
to show that the firm which is the supposed victim of the
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boycott was behaving illegaly and that the boycott is the
only available and least restrictive response.533
d) § 26(2) GWB
The GWB's concern of coping with the threat to competi-
tion caused by market dominating enterprises can be per-
ceived from the fact that the general abuse provision of §
22(4) GWB was amended and that the statutory scope of §
26(2)(2) GWB was broadened. Under § 26(2) GWB, all kinds of
strategic market conduct which has probable effects on
market behavior and market structure; such as refusal to
sell, discrimination, exclusive dealing arrangements, and
tying arrangements may be challenged.
§ 26(2) GWB prohibits market dominating firms534 and
firms "insofar as suppliers or purchasers of certain types
of goods or commercial services depend on them"535 from un-
fairly hindering another enterprise in business activities
or from treating similar enterprises differently.
Two facts indicate, how serious the lawmaker of the GWB took
the threat of "powerful" firms: First, § 26(2)(2) GWB, the
"dependency" provision was added in 1973 (before 1973 only
the conduct of market dominating firms could be challenged
under § 26(2) GWB). Courts know different categories of
cases were a dependency relationship may exist. For example,
dependency can be based (l)on assortment, (2)on supply
relationship, (3)on shortages, and (4) dependence on a par-
ticular enterprise.536 Especially the first category, the
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dependence on a certain article, is focused on. For example,
in the famous Rossignol case,537 the German Supreme Court
held that the manufacturer of Rossignol skies due to the
wellknown skies occupied a dependency creating position in
the market. Accordingly, the BGH held that Rossignol was
obliged to supply a sporting goods store with its skies. The
dependency requirement was held to be given although Rossig-
nol had only a market share of 8 percent. Therefore, espe-
cially the "dependency" notion of § 26(2) GWB is a strong
device to limit the exercise of "superior bargaining power."
Second, § 26(2) GWB is one the few provisions of the
GWB which directly protects the market participant as an in-
dividual and not just indirectly as a participant in the
competitive process. One of the most important features of §
26(2) GWB is that it enables individual enterprises to in-
voke their rights protected by § 26 GWB.53B
e) § 26(2) GWB and the Use of Economic Theory
The courts have to apply economic theory in considering
several questions: first, to establish market power or a
dependency relationship; second, in determining whether a
conduct is hindrance or discriminatory; third, in evaluating
whether the conduct is "unfair" hindrance or discrimination
"without justification."
(l)Market dominance is defined in the statute itself.539 A
dependency relationship has to be evaluated in case by case
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analysis and requires the courts to investigate into the
specific markets involved.
(2)Hindrance is given when one enterprise manoeuvers another
enterprise in a disadvantageous position. The "unfairnessll
of the hindrance is determined by lIweighing the interests of
the two parties in the light of the procompetitive goals of
the statute.540 The more market power the hindering party
possesses, the greater is need to protect the hindered
party.54~
According to the legislative language a "discrimination
without justification" is prohibited. The discriminating
firm has to offer a justification for its discrimination.
The courts are required to analyze the justification offered
for the restraint (in this analysis the courts will employ
the same consideration as in defining "abuse", infra)
f) § 37a(3) GWB
§ 37a(3) GWB is another provision which was added to
the GWB in 1973. Although § 37a(3) GWB has insofar little
practical relevance this provision highlights very clearly
the purpose of the GWB and its different approach towards
restraints even when they are unilaterally imposed.
§ 37a(3) states:
The cartel authority may also prohibit an enter-
prise which, as a result of its superior market
power in relation to its small and medium-sized
competitors, is able to influence market conditions
substantially from adopting conduct that directly
or indirectly unfairly hinders such competitors and
is likely to impair competition permanently.
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§ 37(a)(3) GWBThis provision does not intend to provide
"social protection" to small businessmen.542 However,
§ 37a(3) GWB clearly states that the protection of small and
middle-size competitors and the prevention of market con-
centration are goals of the GWB. Enterprises which are not
able to cope with unfair conduct of their bigger competitors
such as exclusive dealing shall be protected against being
driven out of business.543 However, like §§ 22(4) and 26(2)
GWB it is also necessary to give a meaning to the vague term
"unfairly hinder" used in § 37(a) GWB to describe unwanted
conduct.
7. Giving Vague Terms a Meaning
The question whether a conduct constitutes an abuse
under § 22(4) GWB or will be considered to be unfair
hindrance or discrimination in the meaning of § 26(2) GWB is
the most difficult problem in applying §§ 22(4) and 26(2)
GWB. However, the question of whether certain strategies are
benigm or harmful to competition can be answered differently
depending on the applied theory and the time horizon. Unlike
American antitrust law where conflicting theories directly
influence the reasoning of the courts, under the GWB the
courts are limited in their analysis. For example, under the
GWB intrabrand competition cannot be ignored and efficiency
arguments are considered second place. This explains why the
GWB remained almost static while the American antitrust law
changed drastically.544
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The GWB choose a compromise between flexibility and the
rule of law. The GWB proscribes the values and the policy of
its approach towards certain behavior, such as strategic
market conduct and the courts pursue their analysis in com-
pliance with the proscribed goals. Therefore the scope of
the courts analysis is limited by the legal provisions.
Moschel concludes "goal conflicts can arise between the
economic plausibility of particular rules and the necessity
of their justiciability and predictability. The German ap-
plication of cartel law has always been intellectually con-
scious that it can attempt to commit, as it were, only the
lesser evil."545
Whenever a case involving §§ 22(4); 26(2) GWB comes
before the court, the following phrase will serve as
reference for the further reasoning of the court: an evalua-
tion of the conduct in question makes it necessary "to
balance the conflicting interests in the light of the goal
of the GWB to protect the freedom of competition."546
a) Development of Rules
However, as long as no prima facie case is established,
it is very difficult to predict under which circumstances a
certain conduct and/or restraints will be condemned as con-
stituting unfair hindrance or discrimination.
This analysis requires interpretation and application
of economic theory by the courts. This analysis is par-
ticularly difficult because the provisions of the GWB
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dealing with strategic market conduct do not intend to deter
or prohibit efficient or otherwise justified market be-
havior. Moschel states that this "would-be a perversion of
competition law."s47
However, the role of economic evidence is different
than under American antitrust law. When economic arguments
come into play to assists the courts in evaluating the ques-
tionable conduct, the courts focus on the restrictions of
the specific case rather than applying a broad ranging rule
of reason scrutiny. The evaluation is normatively directed
and the GWB proscribes that the interest of the individal in
maintaining its freedom of action is preeminent.s48
Although not codified, the courts developed according
to the values protected under the GWB some general rules
which are guiding the analysis of the courts.
First, as a rule of thumb, the GWB reduces the freedom to
employ strategic market conduct inversely proportionately to
the market power of the employing firm.s49 Likewise, the
more restrictive the conduct, the better must be the jus-
tification for its application.
Second, every restraint which is aimed at achieving conduct
prohibited under the GWB will be automatically considered to
be unjustified. For example, the legislative intent of § 15
GWB influences the reasoning in the area of strategic con-
duct as soon as effects on prices are probable.sso
Third, the courts will ask whether the same effect can be
achieved with less restrictive means.
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Furthermore it is noteworthy that a general efficiency
defense alleging procompetitive effects is not accepted by
the GWB and even if this defense were held admissable it
could not overcome market structure concerns.551
b) Accepted Defenses
To evaluate the business justification, the courts ask
whether there is an objective reason in the specific busi-
ness relationship. The proffered justifications may not con-
flict with the goals of the GWB and have to be balanced
against each other in the light of the goals and purposes of
the GWB.552
The courts are willing to accept legitimate interest of
the parties employing the restraint and are particularly
favorable to restraints which are imposed to enhance the
ability of a firm to compete.553 It is acknowledged that
firms are generally free to design their distribution system
a~d that they are free to impose qualitative requirements
such as qualified sales-personal, adequate presentation,
repair services, and pre- and after sales services. On the
other hand: the GWB condemns every attempt to exclude cer-
tain dealer forms, such as discounters or department stores
from delivery when these stores are able to comply with the
qualitative requirements.554 Particularly, selective
dis·tribution arrangements are subject to scrutiny whether
these arrangements involve an attempt to unduly suppress
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competition or to circumvent the prohibition of resale price
maintenance. 555
c) Shifting the Burden of Proof
But, as the discussion in America shows, the argument
that a restraint may enhance the ability to compete can al-
ways be raised.
In this case the question of which party bears the bur-
den of proof becomes crucial. Hence the GWB is suspicious
with restraints caused by circumstance (because of the
market power) in the area of §§ 22(4) and 26(2) GWB the GWB
uses means of legal presumptions or prima facie violations
to ease the plaintiffs burden of proof. The defendant, who
should know for what reasons he employed a certain conduct
has to submit business justifications that his conduct is
objectively justified556 (Gerber uses the term "material
justification" to describe the kind of justification ac-
cepted under the GWB).557
However, in evaluating the proffered justification the
courts again refer to the statement which is guiding every
analysis: "The interests of the two parties have to be
weighed in the light of the pro-competitive goals of the
statute".55B
d) The Balancing Process by the Courts
Although this analysis is not as broad as under
American antitrust law, the court's discretion is
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considerable. The courts will refer to the goal of the GWB
to maintaining the freedom of the individuals in their
decision to participate in the competitive process. The
question of how much economic freedom of the individual
remains under the influence of market imperfections and
whether an adverse effect on the openness of the markets
occurs will be analyzed. However, the courts still have to
balance the interest between the firm which is employing the
restraint with the restriction imposed on the other firm.
Some examples might illustrate the reasoning of the
courts and show how economic theory is applied and which
defenses are accepted by the courts:
Courts decided that it is unfair of a manufacturer not
to provide original spare parts to a repair shop to protect
its own repair business.55g However, it was accepted that a
manufacturer has not the duty to provide spare parts to an
independent repair shop if this repair shop deals with com-
peting products560 or if its repairs are not satisfac-
tory.561
In a recent benchmark case,562 VW dealers challenged an
exclusive dealing arrangement which allowed them to use for
their repairs exclusively VW spare parts which were supplied
by VW. VW defended its restraint with the argument that only
parts provided by VW could meet the VW quality standards and
that the protection of VW's good will required that
restraint. The dealers argued that at least so called "iden-
tical parts", i.e. parts which are manufactured by the same
133
manufacturers which produce for VW should be excepted from
the restrictive covenant. The lower court563 relied on the
"less restrictive means" argument and held that the
restraint was abusive and thus these identical parts may be
used by the VW dealers if they inform their customers that
no "original VW part" will be used. The German Supreme Court
reversed and decided that the quality defense should pre-
vail.564
This decision was heavily criticized and it is recog-
nized that this case reached the limit of admissable
defenses.565
e) Giving Vague Terms a Meaning
Although the GWB provides differentiated and detailed
rules the courts face problems to interpret indefinite
statutory terms, such as the "abuse" and "unfair dicrimina-
tion." Therefore, the courts categorized some cases as prima
facie abusive (i.e. tie-ins of market dominating firms or
certain discounting practices). However, as long as no prima
facie case is given, the courts have to evaluate the prof-
fered justification and to balance it by considering the
interests of the involved parties and the impact on competi-
tion. This evaluation raises extraordinary demarcation
problems. Hence, the GWB does not intend to prohibit effe-
cient or legitimate conduct. Again, the courts created means
of guiding the analysis. For example, courts will consider
whether a conduct is conform to the concept of "competition
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based on performance."566 If the party which is employing a
"suspect" conduct defends the conduct with the justification
that it is aimed to achieve effiency (e.g. when designing a
new distribution sysytem) and promote competition, rather
than to reduce the competitive opportunities, the conduct
may be justified. However, as Schmidt567 points out, the
term "competition based on performance" is no advance in
achieving predictability. Especially in "difficult" cases,
where demarcation problems exist, the reference to terms
which are almost as vague as the terms they are supposed to
explain does not contribute to adaequately evaluate the
questionable conduct.56B However, although the courts have
the tendency to rely on "terms" or "definitions" the ana-
lysis of the justification will, in the end, include "a
weighing or balancing of the interests of the parties in-
volved in light of the goals and purposes of the
statute. ,,569
VI. SUMMARY
A. Results of the Research and Comparison
Vertical restraints are restricting the competitive
freedom of market participants. A retailer might have to buy
his whole supply from one manufacturer or his freedom to set
prices might be restricted. However, in most of the cases
these restrictions imposed in contractual relationships may
contribute to the enhancement of overall competition or may
have sound business justifications. Furthermore, the sel-
ler's freedom in designing an effective marketing scheme and
imposing restrictive covenants is an essential part of free
market competition.
On the other hand, vertical restraints and, likewise,
strategic market conduct might not only limit the in-
dividual's competitive freedom but also stifle overall com-
petition. If most retailers are bound by exclusive dealing
arrangements a new market entrant will face problems to find
retail outlets for his product. If prices are fixed a
retailer is prevented from using the parameter price as
means to strive for business.
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Due to this complexity, extreme difficult demarcation
problems exist. The difficulty of drawing a borderline which
meets the requirements of adequately protecting competition
without suppressing beneficial business conduct is reason
for dispute among economists and legal scholars. Economic
theory contributes theoretical analysis, based on theoreti-
cal models, which -- although often conflicting -- are in-
trinsically plausible. Legal scholars face the problem of
implementing the perceptions of economic theory into the law
and legal reasoning and of maintaining sufficient flexibili-
ty without completely abandoning the "rule of law".57o More-
over, the legal analysis is not limited to economic con-
siderations, but incorporates also noneconomic arguments.
To enact practicable antitrust laws which guide the
approach towards vertical restraints, basic determinations
must be made. These determinations reflect policy and method
decisions and are influenced anew by economic theory. For
example, the decision to reward treble damages is at first
sight a policy decision to punish anticompetitive behavior.
However, this decision may have the economic effect that
businessmen, especially when the state of the law is some-
what unclear, are deterred from employing procompetitive
conduct because of being afraid to trigger antitrust suits.
1. Suggestion to Solve the Dilemma
To make antitrust law "work" the following determina-
tions should be made: First, the goals of antitrust must be
137
defined. In particular, the question of whether noneconomic
goals should be included in antitrust analysis must be
answered. Second, an economic theory which complies with the
goals of antitrust law must be selected and its role for the
application of antitrust law must be clarified. Third, the
role of the courts viz a viz the legislative authority must
be clarified. Fourth, efficient enforcement must be guaran-
teed to transform the legal perception into action without
deterring benign conduct. Fifth, the law must provide
manageable standards for its application which are com-
patible with the amorphous area of vertical restraints.
2. The Approach of the GWB -- Favoring the "Rule of Law" and
Pursuing a Multi-Valued Goal
The German antitrust law choose -- according to its
civil law concept -- an approach which establishes the
policy decision of the lawmaker and leaves little discretion
to the courts. The GWB pursues a multivalued goal. It has
legal, economic, and social functions.57~ The legal function
protects the two components of freedom of contracts: freedom
to enter contracts and freedom to agree on contract terms.
However, the GWB recognizes that this freedom requires equal
bargaining power because otherwise this freedom becomes the
freedom of the party with superior bargaining power to
coerce the party with inferior bargaining power to accept
restrictive covenants. The GWB's concern with regard to
"powerful" firms is especially reflected in §§ 22(4), 26(2),
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and 37(a) GWB which subjugate conduct of certain "powerful"
firms special treatment. The economic policy function is
aimed at maintaining a free and viable market place. In the
area of vertical restraints the GWB particularly opposes
market foreclosure effects. According to the GWB's concept a
free market place consists of freedom of inter- and in-
trabrand competition, so-called "Allstufenwettbewerb" (all
level competition).572 The social policy function is in-
tended to distribute income and wealth. Prevention of econo-
mic power is another societal goal of the GWB.
According to these goals the GWB's approach towards
vertical restraints is not limited to economic arguments.
The freedom of the market participants is of special con-
cern. Furthermore, in order to contribute to democracy the
GWB opposes the creation or exploitation of undue differen-
ces in economic power. The lawmaker of the GWB recognized
that no theoretical model of economic theory could provide
adequate guidance for the GWB's application. The suggested
workability and group competition concepts lacked adequate
comprehension of static/dynamic effects or were suspect be-
cause they were too vague. Neoclassical theory as leading
principle was rejected because it did not fit into the real
business world. The GWB mistrusts the notion that competi-
tion maintains itself. Therefore, the GWB has adopted a con-
cept which is best described as a "concept of the practical
freedom of competition".573 The "concept of the practical
freedom of competition" is perceivable from different norms
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and the legislative history of the GWB. However, it is not
the courts which apply these concepts, rather they follow in
their reasoning the direction given by the GWB ("normatively
directed discretion").
Unlike the American antitrust law the GWB's enforcement
is mainly vested in the hands of the Federal Cartel
Authority Only in particular cases individuals may invoke
the antitrust laws. Another interesting feature of the GWB
is that it establishes different standards according to the
firms' market power.
a) Treatment of Vertical Restraints under the GWB
Vertical restraints undergo the following treatment:
(1) Resale price maintenance is pe se illegal under § 15
GWB. The GWB adopted the per se rule to foster intrabrand
competition and to leave the decision about the core
parameter of competitive behavior on the dealer level.
Furthermore the prohibition of resale price maintenance
promotes freedom of action, which is a major goal of the
GWB. The prohibition of resale price maintenance is strictly
enforced and safeguarded by other norms of the GWB. Par-
ticularly every attempt to threaten a dealer to coerce him
to adhere to a certain pricing scheme is prohibited.
(2) Other vertical nonprice restraints are basically allowed
under § 18 GWB. However, it is to note that this favorable
treatment partly rests in the complicated statutory language
of § 18 GWB rather than on economic theory.
140
b) The GWB's Approach to Conduct of "Powerful" Firms
Both unilateral and bilateral conduct of market
dominating firms and firms which are able to create a depen-
dency relationship is prohibited when it is considered
abusive, an unfair hindrance, or unfair discrimination. This
three terms overlap and according to the GWB's concept of
competition conduct is more likely to fall into one of these
three categories the more the conduct affects competition.
§ 26(2) GWB is an especially effective means of chal-
lenging to challenge unilateral market conduct. Under §
26(2) GWB a firm might be forced to sell. Interestingly, the
rigid standard of § 26(2) GWB is explained with a view to
the prohibition of resale price maintenance. § 26(2) GWB is
used to challenge selective distribution systems which are
employed as a means of achieving and maintaining certain
price levels. The enforcement of § 26(2) GWB is eased by
legal presumptions and, moreover, § 26(2) GWB is one of the
few provisions which might be invoked by the individual.
3. The Approach of the American Antitrust Law -- Broad-
Ranging Standards and Uncertainty About the Goals
The American antitrust law follows a common law con-
cept. Accordingly, the statutory language of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts leaves broad discretion to the courts. This
discretion led to inconsistent, changing, and sometimes
chaotic judicial reasoning. At present, the goals of an-
titrust law and the role of economic theory are hotly
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debated. The New Coalition counters the assertion of the
Chicago School that "economic efficiency" and "consumer wel-
fare" are the only goals of antitrust with the argument that
both legislative history and judicial reasoning support a
different view. According to the New Coalition American an-
titrust law pursues four goals: "(l)dispersion of economic
power, (2)freedom and opportunity to compete on the merits,
(3) satisfaction of the consumers, and (4) protection of the
competitive process as a market governor".574 The outcome of
this debate will have an crucial impact in the area of ver-
tical restraints. Should the view of the Chicago School
prevail, antitrust law in the area of vertical restraints
would be very simple: vertical restraints would be generally
per se legal. Should the New Coalition's view prevail, an-
titrust law in the area of vertical restraints would have
the task to protect the values which are promoted by the New
Coalition and the role of economic theory would be less
dominant.
a) Vertical Restraints under American Antitrust Law
At present, the American antitrust law treats vertical
restraints as follows: (1) Agreements to fix prices are per
se illegal.575 However, unlike the GWB, American antitrust
law allows considerable ersatz strategies. Only agreements
or conspiracies may be challenged under Sec. 1 of the Sher-
man Act and Sec. 3 of the Clayton Act. unilateral conduct
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which is aimed at producing adherence to a certain pricing
scheme escapes antitrust condemnation.
Furthermore, in reliance on neoclassical theory, the
Supreme Court raised in Monsanto576 and Business
Electronics577 the burden of proof prohibitively.
Besides resale price maintenance, only tying arrangements
are considered to be per se illegal. However, in recent
decisions578 the per se illegality of tying arrangements was
softened and actually "about the only thing left of the per
se rule against tying is the label".579
(2) Vertical nonprice restraints are, since Syl-
vania,580 subject to rule of reason scrutiny. The Court in
Sylvania held that less intrabrand competition may be com-
pensated through an increase in interbrand competition.581
(3) As mentioned before, unilateral conduct, no matter how
anticompetitive its intent and effect cannot be challenged
under the American antitrust law, unless this conduct con-
stitutes an attempt to monopolize. The Colgate doctrine582
is persistently upheld by the courts.
b) A Look into the Future
It is significant that among American scholars and
courts considerable efforts are made to move towards a per
se legality of vertical restraints as promoted by the
Chicago School. However, until now the Supreme Court has
upheld the per se rule against resale price maintenance. At
present, it is not to foresee which development American
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antitrust law in general and the law of vertical restraints
in particular will experience.
B. What is the "Right" Approach?
If one judges the law according to its perception by
courts, scholars, and the public the GWB would be the better
law. However, the perception the GWB achieves is only an
indicator of its acceptance which indirectly allows con-
clusions about its quality. Whether the GWB pursues the
"right" approach to antitrust is a different question. In-
terestingly, the GWB itself does not pursue the "best
choice." The GWB recognizes that antitrust law due to its
complexity and because of the tension between economic
theory and the "rule of law" necessarily needs to be a com-
promise. The GWB prefers maintenance of viable market struc-
ture and the competitive process. Accordingly, resale price
maintenance is considered to be an obstacle to the GWB's
goals. Although sometimes some efficient conduct might be
outlawed, the overall success of the GWB is remarkably high.
Moreover, the multi-valued approach of the GWB, which is
sometimes called the "economic constitution" contributes in
promoting the democratic values of the "overal·l system".
For the same reasons, one cannot judge whether American
antitrust law is "right" or "wrong". However, it is possible
to conclude that American antitrust law faces a methodologi-
cal and enforcement problem. Both problems could be solved
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if the "rule of law" would be promoted by clarifying legis-
lative action. In this way, American antitrust law could
profit from the GWB's conception.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Per Se Legality of Vertical Restraints?
The notion of declaring vertical restraints to be per
se legal should for several reasons be opposed: (l)Antitrust
law is determined to pursue other goals than merely the max-
imization of "consumer welfare". Besides the problem of
giving the vague term "consumer welfare" a meaning complying
with the requirements of the "rule of law," the assertion
that antitrust is not concerned with other goals has to b~
rejected. Antitrust law is both in Germany and America a
part of the democratic system. Accordingly, the democratic
value of maintaining a viable market structure which allows
the individual businessmen to freely participate in the com-
petitive process has to be protected.sB3 This notion is ex-
pressed in the statement of Senator Sherman:sB4
If we will not endure a king as a political power
we should not endure a king over the production,
transportation, and sale of any necessaries of
life. If we would not submit to an emperor we
should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with
power to prevent competition and to fix the price
of any commodity.
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(2)Economic theory should support legal reasoning
rather than replacing it.sSS Economic theory cannot claim to
offer the "right" solution for antitrust law. As the discus-
sion surrounding the Chicago School's theory shows, economic
theory can only offer probable explanations but is not
capable in providing "guaranteed results". For example, the
Chicago School's theory is based on neoclassical price
theory which makes assumptions which do not exist in the
real business world, such as perfectly competitive market
structure, rationality of the market participants, and ab-
sence of externalities. According to its model, the Chicago
School denies the existence of entry barriers.
Actually, entry barriers may constitute substantial
hindrance for new market entrants. Strategic responses to
new market entrants, entry risks, and cost advantages of the
established firms are only few examples. The arguments in
favor of per se illegality are single sidedly highlighting
the positive effects of vertical restraints. In fact, every
argument can be opposed by a counter-argument. The discus-
sion clearly shows that the efficiency argument becomes a
device which can be used to justify every restraint. SSG
Furthermore, as a look at real world business reveals,
market participants do not always behave rationally, espe-
cially the consumer's horizon is restricted by persuasive
advertising and personal preferences. Likewise, it is merely
speculation to assume that businessmen behave perfectly
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rationally and are only striving for efficiency. According-
ly, the assumption that competition is self maintaining is
"belief" rather than "fact".5B7
(3)The rejection of a "single goal" antitrust and the
rejection of Chicago School economic theory consequently
leads to the argument that intrabrand competition should
have a value of its own.
(4)In particular, the notion that resale price main-
tenance should be per se legal has to be rejected. The
freedom to set his prices is often one of the last decisions
left to the retailer. Taking this freedom would make the
markets less competitive and lead to higher prices. It is
more than questionable whether the price increase is out-
weighed by more interbrand competition and whether the price
increase is fully shifted to the consumer by providing him
more services.
For the foregoing reasons, the "per se legality notion"
as promoted by the Chicago School is not a practical alter-
native for either German or American antitrust law. Two of
the most important goals of antitrust law -- protecting
democratic values and maintainance of a viable market struc-
ture -- are unprotected under the Chicago School's approach.
The fundamental policy differences between the Chicago
School and the German (and EEC) approach are expressed in
the 1986 Report on Competition Policy of the European Com-
mission:5BB
148
The Member States of the European Community
share a common commitment to individual rights, to
democratic values and to free institutions. It is
those rights, values and institutions at the
European and national levels that provide neces-
sary checks and balances in our political systems.
Effective competition provides a set of similar
checks and balances in the market economy system.
It preserves the freedom and right of initiative
of the individual economic operator and it fosters
the spirit of enterprise. It creates an environ-
ment within which European industry can grow and
develop in the most efficient manner and at the
same time take account of social goals. Competi-
tion policy should ensure that abusive use of
market power by a few does not undermine the
rights of the many; it should prevent artificial
distortions and enable the market to stimulate
European enterprise to innovate and to remain
competitive on a global scale.
This report supports the philosophy that antitrust law
should maintain a competitive structure as a means to
achieve efficient outcome. If there should be a conflict or
doubt, market structure concerns should come first, ef-
ficiency second.
B. The Colgate Doctrine -- Obstacle to Antitrust Enforcement
The Colgate doctrine5B9 should be abolished and no
enterprise should be allowed to use any pressure to coerce
other enterprises to adhere to a certain pricing scheme.
With regard to Colgate, American antitrust law overem-
phasizes the freedom of contract viz a viz the freedom of
competition. Unilateral conduct may be harmful to competi-
tion and may be used as a device to reach results which are
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otherwise prohibited by antitrust law. Firms which are able
to use their superior power to distort the competitive
process should be subject to more rigid scrutiny.590 The
freedom "not to sell" should be limited and -- in some cases
-- replaced by the "right to buy."591 Even if this approach
seems to be "undemocratic" on first sight, it can be sup-
ported by convincing arguments. The existence of market
dominating firms indicates market imperfections. To cope
with these imperfections and to protect smaller enterprises
from negative effects of market imperfections, the GWB
chooses the arguably more "democratic" way of ensuring
"freedom of competition."
The control of strategic market conduct of market
dominant firms is a means which contributes to mitigate
market imperfections. This is a goal which should be also
supported by American antitrust law.
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tem, Inc. 4~1 U.S. 1 (1979).
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110. For a discussion of Business Electronics, see notes
367-409 and accompanying text.
111. See the dissent of J. Stevens in Business Electronics,
108 S.Ct. 1515, 1526 (1988). Referring to Professor Flynn's
presentation of the article "Legal Reasoning and the Juris-
prudence of Vertical Restraints" (supra note ... ) at the
Airlie House Conference, a scholar commented that Professor
Flynn in attacking the Chicago School unveiled that
Chicago's economic theory is "simply Alice-in-Wonderland
economics", Ponsoldt, The Enrichment of Sellers as a Jus-
tification for Vertical Restraints: A Response to Chicago's
Swiftian Modest Proposal, 62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1166 (1987), at
1169.
112. This problem is addressed in MAXEINER, supra note 17,
at 116-22. See also Braun, supra note 17, at 368.
113. Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning, supra note 54, at
1151.
114. Unlike American antitrust law the provisions of the GWB
are directed against conduct with effect for the future. The
GWB can only prohibit present conduct and conduct which
might have effects in the future. For example the use of
vertical restraints can be prohibited if harm for the market
structure is to expect. Past-directed legal consequences are
not available under the GWB. This difference has a strong
impact on the application, effectiveness and enforcement
policy of the antitrust laws. When under the GWB a practice
involving a policy decision is considered to be harmful the
worst which can happen is that the party which employs the
practice has to abandon the practice. Private claims are
under the GWB generally not available. However, some impor-
tant exceptions exist (§§ 26, 35 GWB). Under the GWB ap-
proach, the businessmen has not to face the consequences of
possible criminal sanctions or (treble) damage suits when he
enters a restrictive agreement. Particularly the fear of
treble damage suits combined with extremely high costs of
the lawsuit which might deter businessmen from using
procompetitive restraints is not known under the GWB.
Moreover, the GWB formulates prohibition norms very clearly,
comparable to the per se rules in the American antitrust
law, these norms provide businessmen and courts with clear
and unambiguous guidelines. Although these provisions might
outlaw some harmless or procompetitive conduct the enhanced
rule of law justifies this approach.
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The American antitrust law, however, knows mainly past-
directed legal consequences such as civil damages and crimi-
nal sanctions. See MAXEINER, supra note 17.
115. The way how the antitrust laws are enforced and who may
invoke a violation of the antitrust laws determines which
role they play for the protection of a free market place.
The best law remains useless if it is not enforced. Under
the GWB basically the Federal Cartel Authority is authorized
to challenge antitrust violations, only a few provision
allow the individual to challenge restraints (e.g. §§ 26(2),
35 GWB). The Federal Cartel Authority surveys the market and
market developments and will act if a certain conduct or the
widespread use of a restraint constitutes a threat for free
market competition. The Federal Cartel Authority is equipped
with experts and the necessary information to screen harmful
conduct out. This concentration of enforcement authority
contributes in avoiding that courts (if the addressee of a
"cease and desist order" challenges this order before court)
have'to deal with cases which are not representing harm for
competition. On the other hand the antitrust enforcement
relies on the quality and willingness of the enforcement
agency. However, if one accepts minor shortcomings, it is to
acknowledge that the Federal Cartel Authority fulfills its
duty in protecting free market competition. See Moschel,
Economic Evidence, supra note 74, at 550. A second feature
which contributes in avoiding inconsistent ruling of the
courts and thus enhances predictability and reliability of
the law is the fact that the decisionmaker in the German
system is highly specialized. Furthermore, lower courts
generally adhere to the ruling of the superior courts.
Moreover, almost every "bigger" antitrust case might be
appealed to the highest court in Germany, the Bundes-
gerichtshof (German Supreme Court), which itself has several
panels (chambers) of judges. One of these panels is specia-
lized in dealing with antitrust cases.
This procedure contributes enhancing the "rule of law."
116. See e.g., Ponsoldt, The Unreasonableness of Coerced
Cooperation: a Comment upon the NCAA Decision's Rejection of
the Chicago School, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 1003 (1986), at 1045-
52 [hereinafter Ponso1dt, NCAA].
117. Sec. 5 FTC ACT, see notes 60, 61 and accompanying text.
118. Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act gives private parties the
right to sue antitrust violators for treble damages, plus
attorneys fees.
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119. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of
1976, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c-h authorized the State Attorney
General to recover for monetary injury suffered by "natural
persons residing in such state." See, e.g., Hawai v. Stan-
dard Oil Co .., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
120. See MAXEINER, supra note 17, at 4-8.
121. See e.g. §§ 26, 35 GWB which enable individuals to
challenging discriminatory conduct. See also notes 534-538
and accompanying text.
122. The Court of Appeals for West Berlin is named Kam-
mergericht (KG).
123. An appeal can be filed to the court when an administra-
tive appeal procedure with the Federal Cartel Authority did
not help.
124. Braun, supra note 17 points out that "'Fishing expedi-
tions' and unmeritorious antitrust suits would be curtailed
if the courts generally awarded attorney's fees to defen-
dants who prevail in the lawsuit." Id. at 367.
125. Braun alleges that "[IJf American judges would assert
greater control over civil antitrust proceedings generally
(as well as over other forms of civil ligitation), and par-
ticularly if the scope of pre-trial discovery were limited
to areas of inquiry determined in advance by the judge in-
stead of by the lawyers, the time and expense of pre-trial
proceedings might be significantly reduced." Braun, supra
note 17, at 366-67. See generally MAXEINER, supra note 17.
See also Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,
52 U.CHI.L.REV. 823 (1985).
126. Fox, Soul of Antitrust, supra note 1, describes the
scenario as a "battle", id., at 917.
127. The headline of the National Law Journal used
the word "counterrevolution" to describe the present dis-
cussion regarding the proper application of the antitrust
laws. See Headline of the National Law Journal on May 4,
1987: "Steam May Be Building for a Counterrevolution in An-
titrust", Nat'l L.J., May 4,1987, at 1. For the background
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of this headline see Fox & Pitofsky, The Antitrust Alterna-
tive, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV. 931, at 932.
128. In an article dealing with the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of the Chicago school in the NCAA case Professor
ponsoldt stated: "The Supreme Court has dealt the Chicago
school its most solid body block since Jay Bringswanger's
days." See Ponsoldt, NCAA, supra note 116, at 1044.
129. This argument was emphasized in Continental T.V. Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
130. See, e.g. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63
TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1984); Baxter, supra note 68. But see
Markovits, The Limits of Simplifying Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L.
REV. 41 (1984)•
131. See, for example, Change in Administration, Change in
Antitrust? Interview with Dean Robert Pitofsky, published in
2 ANTITRUST 24 (1988).
132. It is to note that neither the Chicago School nor the
New Coalition represent a single view in detail, but that
under the label "Chicago School" and "New Coalition" the
prevailing view of the majority of the proponents of the
respective view is addressed. For a list of Chicago scholars
see note III. A good overview of the antitrust alternative
promoted by the New Coalition see e.g. The Antitrust Alter-
native (papers presented at the Airlie House Conference
published in 62 N.Y.U.L.REV.(1987).
133. For examples, see notes 147-149; 168 and accompanying
text.
134. Professor Posner states "The Chicago School has largely
prevailed with respect to its basic point: that the proper
lens for viewing antitrust problems is price theory." Pos-
ner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.Pa.
L.Rev. 925 (1979), at 930 [hereinafter Posner, Chicago
School].
135. The argument that consumers might be "irrational and
manipulable" is not accepted by the Chicago school: "the
Chicago theorist rejects this assumption as inconsistent
with the price theory". Posner, Chicago School, supra note
168
134, at 930. Consequently the Chicago School asserts that
"[t]he rational consumer will pay for advertisement .•• only
to the extent that advertising reduces his costs of search.
The services provided by advertising are therefore real ser-
vices." Id. However, if one looks at advertisements most
often the information provided is not suited and not in-
tended to reduce costs of search but rather to create prefe-
rences between similar or identical products. If according
to the Chicago School assumption this advertising will not
be honored by the consumers billions of dollars in advertis-
ing expenses would be wasted. However, if the Chicago
School's assumption that manufacturer behave rational is
correct, the theory of the Chicago School must be either
wrong with respect to consumers or manufacturers.
136. See Baxter, supra note 68, at 948. However, also the
Chicago School recognizes the problem of facilitating car-
telization, but accepts it only for extraordinary cir-
cumstances. See also the Court's reasoning in Business
Electronics (infra notes 367-409 and accompanying text).
137. For a description of the development of the Chicago
school approach to antitrust analysis, see Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 1~U.Pa.L.ReV:-925
(1979).
138. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978), at 50.
139. BORK, supra note 138, at 111.
140. Id.
141. BORK, supra note 138, at 7. This argument, however, is
based on the assumption that consumers automatically par-
ticipate in an increase of business efficiency. The consumer
will only benefit from an efficiency increase if competition
forces the buyer to pass the increase on to the consumers.
Under the Chicago School theory the competitive pressure is
maintained through the threat of new markets entrants which
are able to enter the market in the absence of entry bar-
riers (the absence of entry barriers is another assumption
of the Chicago School theory). But see RITTALER & SCHMIDT,
supra note 4 (opposing this assumptions as simplistic, un-
realistic and single sided). See also Ponsoldt, Enrichment,
supra note 111.
169
142. Bork states: "Productive efficiency, like allocative
efficiency, is a normative concept and is defined in terms
of consumer welfare. Since a free market system assumes that
consumers define their own welfare, it follows that
productive efficiency consists in offering everything
whether products or services, that consumers are willing to
pay for." BORK, supra note 138, at 104.
143. Allocative efficiency is defined by the Chicago School
as "the placement of resources in the economy, a question of
whether resources are employed in tasks where consumers
value their output most." BORK, supra note 138, at 91. Ap-
plying neoclassical price theory the Chico School reaches
the result marginal costs will equal the market price. Id.,
at 93.
144. Productive efficiency is defined by the Chicago School
as "the effective use of resources by particular firms."
BORK, supra note 138, at 91.
145. See RITTALER & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 48.
146. Bork notices that a multiple-goal antitrust law might
be attracting, but he argues that the exclusive orientation
on consumer welfare is superior:
[A] consumer welfare goal is superior in that it
(1) gives fair warning,
(2) places intensely political and legislative
decisions in Congress instead of the courts,
(3) maintains the integrity of the legislative process,
(4) requires real rather than unreal economic
. distinctions, and
(5) avoids arbitrary or anticonsumer rules.
A multiple-goal approach can achieve none of these
things.
BORK, supra note 138, at 81. For arguments questioning the
superiority of a consumer welfare goal see notes 150-167 and
accompanying text. It is to note that the German Law against
Restraints of Competition pursues a multiple-goal approach
without being exposed to complaints by either manufacturers
or consumers. Moreover it is to remark that Congress had a
multiple-goal approach in mind when enacting antitrust law.
The history of American antitrust law shows that American
Congress enacted the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act
in 1890 as reaction to the trusts. See H. THORELLI, THE·
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955). See e.g., Brown Shoes Co.
v. United States, 370 u.S. 294 (1962), Justice Warren argued
that Congress' concern was also the accumulation of power.
Id. The discussion which goals should govern the American
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antitrust policy has not ended yet. See Hovenkamp, Distribu-
tive Justice and the Antitrust Laws,-sI GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1
(1982); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non Economic Goals of
Antitrust, 127 U.PA.L.REV. 1076 (1979).
147. See, Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restric-
tions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Ap-
proach, 127 U.PA.L.REV. 953, 993 (1977).
148. Posner, Chicago School, supra note 134, at 928.
149. BaRK, supra note 138, at 297.
150. Fox, Soul of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 919.
151. Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 54, at 1133-34.
152. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84
Mich.L.Rev. 213 (1985) (criticizing the Chicago School's ef-
ficiency approach pointing out that the theory is too static
in comparing the extreme hypotheticals of purely competitive
and monopolized markets). RITTALER & SCHMIDT, supra note 4,
at 57-72 are attacking the Chicago School theory for the
same reasons. They argue that the Chicago School failed to
implement newer research in the area of the oligopoly theory
and with regard to the interdependencies of the size of a
firm and its profits. Id.
153. Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 54, at 1133-34.
154. Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 54, at 1131. Citing the
Supreme Courts decision in Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) as example that neoclassi-
cal theory leads to the result that facts of actual disputes
are substituted by the assumptions of the model (and though
the reality is replaced by artificial assumptions). It is
argued that the Supreme Court "ignored the facts of the
antitrust dispute, the goals of antitrust policy, the
separate functions of judge and jury, and the role of sum-
mary judgment in Matsushita", id. at 1131 n. 21. See also
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,
U.S. ; 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988).
155. Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 54, at 1136.
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156. However, although the contesting views agree in this
point they pursue different goals. Chicago scholars want to
implement their views into the law. The New Coalition wants
to use legislation to oppose the Chicago School's theory.
157. See Ponsoldt, The Enrichment of Sellers as a Justifica-
tion for Vertical Restraints: A Response to Chicago's Swif-
tian Modest Proposal, 62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1166 (1987), at 1170.
Fox, Soul of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 920.
158. For the view that economic theory should support rather
than lead antitrust reasoning and that noneconomic arguments
should also be considered see L. A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST
(1977), at 1-13.
159. See Adams & Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency: A Comment,
62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1116 (1987)(The article deals primarily with
the appropriate treatment of mergers and acquisitions.
Nevertheless, the underlying policies of antitrust are also
valid for vertical restraints). Adams and Brock argue that
purpose of antitrust is "to preserve not only individual
freedom, but also more importantly, a free system", ide at
1116. The argument addresses the freedom of the individual
and the freedom of the system. According to the view of
Adams & Brock freedom of both is pursued by the antitrust
laws. This argument seems to reflect more properly the pur-
pose of the antitrust laws than the statement that antitrust
laws are designed to protect competition, not competitors.
See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 767 n. 14 (1980); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-a-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). Otherwise it could inferred
from the latter statement that competition could exist
without competitors. Compare Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reason-
ing and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limi-
tations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution
of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1125. "The competi-
tive process, not -competition', is the key concept in the
analysis. Id., note 87. Interestingly the GWB pursues a
similar approach towards the value of protecting competition
and competitors by favoring the competitive process which,
however, is dependent from a competitive structure, i.e. a
multitude of businessmen which are striving for business.
See, e.g., Fikentscher, Introduction, supra note 70, at 168.
160. See Fox, Antitrust, Economic, and Bias, supra note 58,
at 10.
161. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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162. See notes 147-168 and accompanying text.
163. See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Chal-
lenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65, 88-89 (1982). See also
THORELLI, supra note 30, at 120-21.
164. See Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning, supra note 54,
at 1137.
165. For description of the historic development of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts see THORELLI, supra note 30.
166. See, e.g. the dissent of Justice William O. Douglas in
United Steel Co. v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534
(1948). "Size should ... be jealously watched. In final
analysis, size is the measure of the power of a handful
men over our economy. It can be benign or it can be
dangerous. The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that it
should not exist." Id. at 536.
167. See Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equi-
librium, 66 Cornell L.Rev. 1140, 1182 (1981).
168. Professor Flynn, for example, supports a rule of reason
approach towards resale price maintenance but Professor Pon-
soldt testified in favor of H.R. 585, the Freedom from Ver-
tical Price Fixing Act". Ponsoldt, Enrichment, supra note
111, at 1170.
169. See MAXEINER, supra note 17, at 116.
170. MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 468.
171. See SCHMIDT, supra note 79.
172. See Braun, supra note 17, at 360. See generally W.
MOSCHEL, RECHT DER WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN (1983).
173. MAXEINE~, supra note 17, at 7. Maxeiner points out that
R. Bork's criticism of American antitrust applies to the GWB
as well. Maxeiner questions why the antitrust laws are
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judged so differently in Germany and America although the
same criticism applies. Id., at 7 note 17.
174. Fikentscher, Introduction, supra note 70, at 168.
175. Id.
176. See Fox, Antitrust, Economics, and Bias, 2 Antitrust 6
(1988-)-,-at6. RITTALER & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 107.
177. See Moschel, Economic Evidence, supra note 74, at 525.
178. SCHMIDT, supra note 79, at 81-84.
179. This problem is reflected in the discussion of the
workability competition concept. See notes 188-200 and
accompanying text.
180. SCHMIDT, supra note 79, at 11.
181. See MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 504.
182. RITTALER & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 104-14.
183. Fikentscher, Introduction, supra note 70, at 163-65.
184. See MOSCHEL, WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, supra note 172,
at 3 et seq.
185. The different views are listed in MARTINEK, supra note
79, at 468 et seq.
186. In 1968 A. SchUller was the last scholar who concluded
on the basis of neoclassical theory that all vertical
restraints should be per se illegal. See SchUller, 19 ORDO
171 (1968). ---
187. See F. RITTNER, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (1979), at 279.
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188. J.A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
1934.
189. J.M. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS (1961).
190. E. KANTZENBACH, DIE FUNKTIONSFAHIGKEIT DES WETTBEWERBS
(2d. Ed. 1967).
191. See I. SCHMIDT, US-AMERIKANISCHE UND DEUTSCHE WETTBE-
WERBSPOLITIK (1973), at 54 et seq.
192. W. KARTTE, EIN NEUES LEITBILD FUR DIE WETTBEWERBSPOLI~
TIK (1969), at 94.
193. See MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 475.
194. For example if an restraint actually increases output
and decreases the prices this does not necessarily mean that
the restraint was benign. It might be possible that without
the restraint the output might have been even higher at
lower prices.
195. See MOSCHEL, WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, supra note 172,
at 44. See also Fox, Antitrust, Economics, and Bias, 2 AN-
TITRUST 6 (1988), at 6-10.
196. MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 477.
197. Id.
198. Grosseketteler asserts that vertical integration often
results in externalization of the costs. Therefore consumers
and other competitors have to pay for the "power advantage"
of the integrated firms. Grosseketteler, Die volkswirt-
schaftliche Problematik von Vertriebsskooperationen. Zur
wettbewerbspolitischen Beurteilung von Vertriebsbindungen-,
Alleinvertriebs-, Vertragshandler- und Franchisesystemen, 28
Zeitschrift fUr die gesamte Rechtswissenschaft 325 (1978)(an
economic analysis of vertical restraints in different dis-
tributorship agreements).
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199. This is one of the criticism of the New Coalition, see
Fox, Antitrust, Economics, and Bias, supra note 58, at 7.
200. See Martinek, supra note 79, at 482-84.
201. Especially the view of George J. Stigler was adopted
from the proponents of the group competition concept. See
Salter, Bezugsbindungen in vertikalen Kooperationssystemen,
1983 BETRIEBSBERATER 1241 (1983). B. TIETZ, DER GRUPPENWETT-
BEWERB ALS ELEMENT DER WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK (1983). W.
BENISCH, KOOPERATIONSFIBEL (4th Ed. 1973).
202. Martinek, supra note 79, at 489.
203. See B. TIETZ, supra note 201, at 12 and 101.
204. BENISCH, supra note 201, at 96.
205. See Kohler, Individualwettbewerb und Gruppnwettbewerb
- Besprechung von BGHZ 81, 322 "Original-VW-Ersatzteile II",
146 Zeitschrift fUr Handelsrecht 580 (1982), at 584.
206. Id.
207. Grosseketteler warns that economic experience shows
that generally allowing cooperation leads to more market
imperfections rather than improving markets. Grosseketteler,
supra note 198, at 339. For further examples illustrating
the dynamic of concentration processes see G. WOHE,
ALLGEMEINE BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE (1985), at 316 et seq.
208. See F. RITTNER, KOOPERATION - EIN STRUKTUR- UND
LENKUNGSPRINZIP DER WIRTSCHAFT? (1969), at 7.
209. See F. RITTNER, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTL supra note 187, at
280 et seq. MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 498.
210. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF THE NATIONS (1776); For a German translation, see
WOHLSTAND DER NATIONEN (5th. Edition - translated by H.C-.--
Recktenwald) .
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211. See L. von MISES, DIE GEMEINWIRTSCHAFT (2.d Ed. 1932),
id. NATIONALOKONOMIE (1940). F.A. v. HAYEK, FREIBURGERSTUDIEN (1969).
212. See E. HOPPMANN, WETTBEWERB ALS AUFGABE (1968), at 61et seq.
213. MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 499.
214. Id., at 500.
215. See MOSCHEL, WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, supra note 172,at 49.
216. F. RITTNER, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, supra note 187, at 281.
217. See MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 502. MOSCHEL, WETTBE-
WERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, supra note 172, at 54. F. RITTNER,
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, supra note 187, at 281.
218. MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 502.
219. Id., at 503.
220. Id., at 504.
221. MOSCHEL, WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, supra note 79, at
17 (addressing the oligopoly problem).
222. See, e.g., Posner, The Next Step, supra note 9.
223. Fikentscher, Introduction, supra note 70, at 163.
224. The problem of entry barriers and market foreclosure is
recognized by the GWB. See notes 468-543 and accompanyingtext.
225. See SCHMIDT, supra note 79.
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226. See, e.g. Easterbrook, supra note 130, Marvel & McCaf-
ferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 27
J.L. & Econ. 363 (1985). For further information, see also
the articles in 30 ANTITRUST BULL.
227. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960). Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1464 (1984). Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp. U.S. ; 108 S.Ct. 1515
(1988).
228. See notes 254-263 and accompanying text.
229. See note 55 supra.
230. For example, the Vertical Restraints Guidelines have
been criticized by a majority of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee as "designed to influence courts in private cases to
which the Division is not a party" in an area "where it has
unmistakably shown its intention not to enforce the law for
the past four years.", 48 BNA ATRR 1006 (June 13, 1985).
231. See House Passes Legislation to Reaffirm Per Se Rule
for RPM, Revise Monsanto, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1340, at 743 (Nov. 12, 1987).
232. Although the GWB does not know the rule of reason and
the per se rule, it is slightly incorrect to say that § 15
GWB establishes a "per se rule". A more accurate description
of the GWB's approach is that the prohibition principle ap-
plied to resale price maintenance has an identical effect to
the per se rule under American antitrust law.
233. § 15 GWB provides in full:
Agreements between enterprises with respect to
goods or commercial services relating to markets
located within the area of application of this Act
shall be null and void, insofar as they restrict a
party to them in its freedom to determine prices
or terms of business in contracts which it con-
cludes with third parties in regard to the goods
supplied, other goods, or commercial services.
244. 310 u.S. 150, note 59 (1939).
243. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 u.S. 145 (1968).
239. See Baxter, supra note 68, at 934-35.
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108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988), at ...u.S.246.
247. Unilateral action can only be challenged as an attempt
to monopolize under Sec. 2 Sherman Act. Under the GWB
240. See SCHWARTZ, FLYNN & FIRST, supra note 68, at 588-95.
245. This tendency exists also in the area of horizontal
restraints. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, 104 S.Ct. 2948 (1984). Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 441 u.S. 1
(1979).
241. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362u.S. 29 (1960).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
u.S. 29 (1960); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Co., 465
u.S. 752 (1984); Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp., u.S. ; 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988).
238. Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 314, 50 Stat.
693 (1937). McGuire Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 542, 66 Stat.
631 (1952); repealed Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801
(1975), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 45 (1976 Supp.).
r-
234. 220 u.s. 373 (1911).
235. 220 u.s. 373, at 408-09.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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256. Id.
251. Id.
108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988), 1522 note 3.
108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988).
U.S.
U.S.
260.
259.
258. See Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958).
257. 572 F.2d 883, 885.
255. 433 U.S. 36, 57.
252. See notes 264-279 and accompanying text.
250. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
unilateral conduct not within the scope of Sec. 2 Sherman
Act may lead to antitrust liability.
254. 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833
(1978) ("Ure entire thrust of the GTE Sylvania opinion is
'that departures from the rule of reason standard must be
based on demonstrable economic effects rather than formalis-
tic line drawing'''). Id. at 885.
248. 106 S.Ct. 1045, 1049 (1986).
249. Id. See also Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco,
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